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I Introduction
Who pays for a judgment-proof defendant? Does a plaintiff's interest in
full compensation outweigh a defendant's interest in paying only for the harm
that it caused? Multidefendant litigation raises one more question: What
happens when one defendant settles, one goes to trial, and a third winds up
judgment-proof?1 The law should encourage litigants to resolve disputes, but
should it do so to the detriment of defendants that demand their day in court?
The questions in the preceding paragraph do not have easy answers; in
fact, the Third Restatement of Torts devotes an entire volume solely to the
issue of damage apportionment.2 This Note considers only one aspect of the
tension between comparative fault and full compensation: reallocating
uncollectible damages among parties to a lawsuit. This aspect lacks a clear
consensus. For example, the Third Restatement suggests no fewer than five
schemes for allocating a judgment-proof defendant's share of damages among
parties.' The significance of this issue is apparent when one considers the
1. Several factors can make a defendant judgment-proof Unless specified otherwise,
the terms "judgment proof," "insolvent," "bankrupt," and "immune" are interchangeable.
2. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILrry
(2000).
3. See id. § A19 cmt. e (providing that, under a system of "pure" joint and several
liability, a jury should not include defendants that are immune to judgment in its allocation of
comparative fault; however, a jury should determine the plaintiff's share of fault in relation to
all parties and then apportion liability among only the non-immune parties); id. § B19 cmt. e
(providing that a factfinder should allocate fault to an immune defendant under a several-
liability-only regime); id. § C20 (providing that, under a "hybrid" joint and several liability
system "with reallocation," a factfinder should not allocate fault to a plaintiff's immune
employer unless some parties can pursue contribution against the employer under "applicable
law," or unless "applicable law" allows for the reduction of damages based on the employer's
fault); id. § C21 (providing that, under a "hybrid" joint and several liability system "with
reallocation," a court should re-allocate the portion of a judgment for which codefendants
cannot obtain contribution among all parties, including the plaintiff, on the basis of those
parties' comparative responsibility); id. § DI 9 cmt. f (providing that, under a "hybrid" joint and
several liability system in which joint and several liability depends on a threshold level of fault,
a factfinder should allocate liability to an immune employer unless the defendants can "only"
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numerous high-profile lawsuits in which nominally responsible defendants
have paid grossly disproportionate damages to plaintiffs. For example, in 1987
the Supreme Court of Florida imposed 86% of a damages award against Walt
Disney World, which was itself only 1% at fault for the plaintiff's injuries.4
The plaintiff's husband, 85% liable for her injuries, was immune to suit,5 so
Walt Disney World bore both its 1% share and the husband's 85% share ofthe
plaintiffs $750,000 award.6
This Note examines a topic narrower than just the reallocation of
uncollectible portions of plaintiffs' awards. Specifically, this Note discusses
the reallocation issue in the context of partial settlements perfected under the
maritime law. The maritime law is an excellent area of inquiry because it
allows exploration of the interplay between "pure" joint and several liability
and "pure" comparative fault.7 Furthermore, the bounds of one defendant's
responsibility for another's inability to pay are unclear under the current
maritime jurisprudence. Although this issue is admittedly narrow, it reaches
wider in that its resolution requires one to reconcile tensions between joint and
several liability and proportionate fault.
Admiralty and maritime actions fall under the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.8 Approximately 6.5% oftort claims in federal courts concern maritime
law.9 Maritime jurisdiction applies to torts that both occur on the navigable
waters of the United States and bear a significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity.'0 Because the maritime law is a distinct pronounce-
be held jointly and severally liable); id. § El9 cmt. f (providing that, under a "hybrid" joint and
several liability system in which the type of damages determines whether or not defendants are
jointly or severally liable, a factfinder allocates liability among all parties and "identified
persons," including immune tortfeasors, unless the plaintiff can recover only economic damages
for which the defendants are jointly liable).
4. See Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198,202 (Fla. 1987) (affirming state
appellate court's distribution of liability).
5. See id. at 201 (stating that "competing social policy" prohibits imposition of liability
against spouses).
6. Id. at199.
7. In this Note, the term "pure joint and several liability" references a system of joint and
several liability that is not contingent upon the relative faults of the parties. The term "pure
comparative fault" references a comparative fault scheme in which a comparatively negligent
plaintiff recovers reduced damages, even if the plaintiff is himself predominantly liable.
8. U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 1.
9. See STATISTICS Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD STATISTICS, Mar. 31, 2002, at 44 (2002) (stating, inter alia, that 2,240 of 34,424
total "tort actions" concerned "marine" claims). Moreover, 5% of contract claims in federal
courts concern maritime matters. See id. (stating, inter alia, that 2,402 of 48,927 contract
claims concerned "marine" claims).
10. See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 672-73 (1982) (reviewing
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ment of "federal common law,""I maritime decisions can be highly influential
in tort law's development.12 For example, the United States Supreme Court's
decision in East River Steamship v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,13 articulating
the grounds and rationales of the economic loss rule,14 has strongly influenced
both state and federal causes of action. 5
Recently, the Court has modified the maritime law by adopting compara-
tive fault,16 retaining joint and several liability, 7 and applying "proportionate
share" apportionment when parties partially settle claims. 8 Notwithstanding
historic bounds of maritime jurisdiction and the effect of the Court's decision in Executive Jet
Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972)).
11. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1332 (1996) (stating that maritime law is "[p]erhaps the most extensive
modem enclave" of federal common law).
12. See Arden J. Lea & R. Jeffrey Bridger, McDermott v. AmClyde and the Rule of
Proportionate Fault: Maritime Law Leads in Developing a Fair, Consistent and Efficient
Creditfor Settlement Rule, 19 TUL. MAIL L.J. 261,277 (1995) (noting that the Court's maritime
decision in McDermog Inc. v. AmClyde will likely "impact" many other areas of law); see also
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 207 (1994) ("[T]he Judiciary has traditionally
taken the lead in formulating flexible and fair remedies in the law maritime." (quoting United
States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397,409 (1975))).
13. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986). East River
Steamship concerned tort claims for damages arising from an oil tanker's defective steam
turbine. Id. at 861. As a result of the turbine's defect, the tanker's owners had incurred repair
costs and had lost income while the tanker could not be used.' Id. Because the statute of
limitations barred actions for breach of contract, id., the Court considered whether or not the
plaintiff's claims were cognizable in tort. Id. at 859. After reviewing other courts' approaches
to the problem, the Court concluded that a manufacturer has no tort duty to prevent a product
from damaging itself. Id. at 868-71.
14. See id. at 876 (stating that whether framed in negligence or strict liability, no tort
action lies for purely economic loss).
15. See Mary J. Davis, The Supreme Court and Our Culture oflrresponsibility, 31 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 1075, 1086-87 (1996) (stating that "most states" have followed East River
Steamship's articulation of the economic loss rule). For examples of cases relying on East River
Steamship, see 2-J Corp. v. Tice, 126 F.3d 539, 542 (3d Cir. 1997); Nat'l Tel. Co-op. As'n v.
Exxon Corp., 38 F. Supp. 2d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 1998); Lloyd Wood Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co.,
543 So. 2d 671,672 (Ala. 1989); Comptech Int'l, Inc. v. Milam Commerce Park, Ltd., 753 So.
2d 1219, 1224 (Fla. 1999); Trans States Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Can., Inc., 682 N.E.2d 45,
54 (Ill. 1997); Progressive Ins. Co. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 749 N.E.2d 484, 489 (Ind. 2001);
Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 618 (Mich. 1992).
16. See Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. at 411 (holding that the maritime law should allocate
liability according to the comparative fault of the parties).
17. See McDermott, 511 U.S. at 220 (stating that the Edmonds opinion, which adopted
comparative fault in the maritime law, "merely reaffirm[s]" joint and several liability); Edmonds
v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 271 n.30 (1979) (holding that adoption
of comparative fault "did not upset" the scheme ofjoint and several liability).
18. McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202,204 (1994).
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these developments, the precise interplay of these principles in the arena of
judgment-proof defendants remains unclear. 9 On the one hand, joint and
several liability allows a plaintiff to recover all of its damages from any
concurrent tortfeasor and thus makes codefendants liable for a judgment-proof
defendant's share of damages.20 On the other hand, comparative fault and
proportionate share apportionment limit the liability of nonsettling defendants
to their proportionate shares of the plaintiff's damages. 21 The Third Restate-
ment describes joint and several liability's imposition of the risk of insolvency
on codefendants as "difficult to square with comparative responsibility."I
Though this issue is not unique to the maritime law, it is one that many
states do not face because of widespread legislative modification of joint and
several liability principles at the state level in recent years.23 The issue of
apportioning a judgment-proof defendant's share of damages is often null at
the state level because tort reform has eliminated the issue or provided statu-
tory guidance for its resolution .2  However, the maritime law still incorporates
"pure" joint and several liability.' Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated
that the first goal of the maritime law in apportioning damages is full compen-
sation to the plaintiff.26 The rub, then, is doing so in a manner that is fair to all
parties.
19. See Lea & Bridger, supra note 12, at 275 (1995) (noting that most discussions of
settlement regimes "raise the problems" of insolvent tortfeasors).
20. See Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 269 (holding shipowner solely liable for longshoreman's
damages, in spite of statutorily immune stevedore's concurrent fault, by operation of joint and
several liability).
21. See McDermott, 511 U.S. at 209 (stating that under proportionate share allocation,
nonsettling defendant cannot seek contribution because it pays only its proportionate share of
plaintiff's damages).
22. RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OFLIAB. § 10 cmt. a(2000).
23. See Kathleen M. O'Connor & Gregory P. Sreenan, Apportionment of Damages:
Evolution ofa Fault-Based System ofLiabilityforNegligence, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 365, 374-75
(1996) (noting that approximately thirty-five states have abolished or modified joint and several
liability).
24. See id. at 375 (stating that joint and several liability reforms range from complete
abolition to modification or limited application); id. at 377-78 (noting that some state statutes
reallocate judgment-proof defendants' shares).
25. See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 220-21 (1994) (reviewing the
history of joint and several liability in maritime law and concluding that the adoption of both
comparative fault and proportionate share apportionment did not modify this doctrine).
26. See id. at 221 (stating that, under joint and several liability, codefendants bear the
burden of a defendant's insolvency rather than the plaintiff); see also O'Connor & Sreenan,
supra note 23, at 375 (noting that the "real issue" in apportionment is the allocation of the risk
of a defendant's insolvency or absence, and that several liability places that risk entirely on the
plaintiff).
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Part II of this Note reviews two influential maritime decisions from the
Supreme Court, Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique27 and
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde,2" and articulates the exact problems their
holdings present when defendants are judgment-proof. Part III lays the
groundwork for solving these problems by arguing that partial settlements
reflect the potential damages, not the actual damages, awarded among parties
at trial. Part IV then suggests that the mutual embrace of pro rata apportion-
ment and joint and several liability compels proportionately reallocating
judgment-proof defendants' shares of damages to all defendants and imputing
those shares to prior settlements. Furthermore, Part IV details the operation
of this solution, labeling the approach "limited joint and several liability."
Part IV then analyzes limited joint and several liability in fight of the objec-
tives and bases of damages allocation pronounced by the Court. Both Parts
HI and IV incorporate mathematical abstractions to demonstrate the effect of
various apportionment schemes on the parties to a suit. Part V analogizes the
approach to state and federal decisions addressing the reallocation of individ-
uals' joint obligations. Part VI concludes that the end is in fact the beginning:
confusion over the apportionment of damages owes to the frame of reference,
not the intractability of the problem.
II. The McDermott and Edmonds Problem:
The Judgment-Proof Defendant
A. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique:
Continued Vitality for Joint and Several Liability
Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique begins this Note
because it was in Edmonds that the Court concluded that joint and several
liability survived as a mode for fully compensating plaintiffs, notwithstanding
two intervening legal developments: comparative fault and immunity for
employers. In Edmonds, a longshoreman recovered a $100,000 verdict against
the stevedoring company that employed him and the owner of the ship on
which he was working.29 Because federal law made the stevedoring company
immune from the longshoreman's claim for damages, 30 the Supreme Court
27. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979). A discussion
of the issues, holding, and import of Edmonds follows in subpart IIA.
28. McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202 (1994). For a discussion of the issues,
holding, and import of Edmonds, see infra subpart ll.B.
29. Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 258.
30. Id. at 261 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1976), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 905 (Supp. II
1984)).
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faced the task of reallocating this company's share of damages." Moreover,
recent amendments to the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA)32 barred contribution claims against the employer.33 The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had reasoned that Congress's disallowance
of contribution against the stevedoring company, in conjunction with its
allowance of claims against the shipowner, dictated a strictly proportionate
damages allocation: the preclusion and allowance could "be harmonized only
if read in apportioned terms." 34 Thus, the Fourth Circuit had held that the
shipowner was liable only for its proportionate share of the plaintiff's dam-
ages.
35
Reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Court began its decision by noting that
Congress had amended the LHWCA in response to rulings of the Court.
3 6
Nothing in the legislative history of the LHWCA amendments indicated that
Congress had intended to change the common law rule of joint and several
liability.37 Furthermore, the Court found that Congress contemplated the
continuation of joint and several liability in a longshoreman's claims against
a negligent shipowner.31 Though "[s]ome inequity appears inevitable in the
present statutory scheme," that inequity does not indicate that Congress
intended to place the burden on the injured longshoreman "whom the
[LHWCA] seeks to protect.1
39
The Court also considered overruling joint and several liability on its own
accord. Finding that Congress had understood joint and several principles to
stipulate full recovery from a negligent shipowner, the Court declined to
modify the principle. The Court reasoned that such a modification "would
effectively alter the statute by causing it to reach different results than Con-
gress envisioned. "40 When Congress acts on conditions created by the Court
31. See id. at 258-59 (stating that Court granted certiorari to resolve whether or not
shipowner was liable for only its proportionate share of damages).
32. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (2000).
33. Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 262-63 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1976), amended by 33
U.S.C. § 905 (Supp. 11 1984)).
34. Id. (quoting Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 577 F.2d 1153, 1155
(4th Cir. 1978)).
35. Id. at 258-59 (citing Edmonds, 577 F.2d at 1155-56).
36. Id. at 262.
37. See id. at 266-67 (noting that the legislative history counseled against the Fourth
Circuit's construction).
38. See id. at 267-68 (discussing 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1976), amended by 33 U.S.C. § 905
(Supp. 11 1984), and noting that Congress expressed no intent to change the common law, but
did express an interest in not limiting a shipowner's liability).
39. Id. at 270.
40. Id. at 273.
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itself, the Court is "not as free as [it] would otherwise be" to change those
conditions.
41
In the end, Edmonds resolves tension between proportionate fault and
joint and several liability in favor of full compensation for the plaintiff.42
Though the law favors the proportionate allocation of judgments among
defendants, a plaintiff's interest in full recovery outweighs a defendant's
interest in limiting its exposure.43 Joint and several liability remains the
course, even though it sometimes results in grossly disproportionate judgments
against defendants.
B. McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde: Enter the Proportionate Settlement
Fifteen years after Edmonds, the Court faced a somewhat different juxta-
position: comparative fault, joint and several liability, and partial settlement.
McDermott, Inc. sued a crane manufacturer (AmClyde), the manufacturer of
a hook (River Don), and three manufacturers of steel slings for property
damage.44 Before trial, the sling defendants settled with McDermott for $1
million.4" The jury trial resulted in a $2.1 million verdict, with liability appor-
tioned 32% to AmClyde and 38% to River Don.46 The plaintiff and the sling
defendants were collectively 30% responsible.47 At trial, the district court
apportioned damages under a pro rata approach, entering judgment for 32% of
the $2.1 million verdict against AmClyde ($672,000) and 38% against River
Don ($798,000).8 Under the district court's judgment, McDermott's total
recovery was $2,470,000: the $1 million settlement and the $1,470,000 against
AmClyde and River Don.
WhenMcDermott made its way to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, the court reversed the district judge. 49 First, the Fifth Circuit found
AmClyde immune to McDermott's action by operation of a prior contract
41. Id.
42. See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 220 (1994) (stating that Edmonds
both affirmed joint and several liability and demonstrated that the adoption of proportionate
fault did not "abrogate" joint and several liability).
43. See Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 270 (reasoning that any inequity in the allocation of
damages should not fall on an injured longshoreman, as this is the party that Congress intended
to protect).
44. McDermott, 511 U.S. at 204-05.
45. Id. at 205.
46. Id. at 206.
47. See id. at 206 n.5 (stating that a special interrogatory to the jury instructed it to
consider the fault of the plaintiff and the sling defendants jointly).
48. Id. at 206.
49. McDermott, Inc. v. Clyde Iron, 979 F.2d 1068, 1072 (5th Cir. 1993), rev'dsub nom.,
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202 (1994).
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between the two.5° Second, the Fifth Circuit apportioned the judgment "pro
tanto," reducing it "dollar for dollar" by the amount of McDermott's prior
settlement .5  Because the damages taxed against all defendants at trial were
$1.47 million ($2.1 million reduced by the 30% fault apportioned to plaintiff
McDermott and the settled defendants), the Fifth Circuit held that McDermott
could recover a maximum of $470,000 ($1.47 million less the $1 million
settlement).
52
The Supreme Court granted certiorari; the issue on appeal was damages
apportionment in cases of partial settlement.53 Should a plaintiff recover the
"net" of the verdict less the amounts received in settlement54--making the
nonsettlors liable for all of the judgment that is not yet paid? Or instead,
should the plaintiff recover only the nonsettling defendant's comparative share
of damages55--in this instance resulting in the plaintiff recovering a sum
greater than the verdict?
The Court began its decision with the Second Restatement of Torts.56 The
Restatement suggested three possible allocation mechanisms. The first alloca-
tion rule, "pro tanto with contribution," reduces the nonsettling defendants'
liability by the amount of the settlement. Defendants paying more than their
equitable shares of damages are free to pursue contribution from other defen-
dants.57 The second apportionment mechanism, "pro tanto without contribu-
tion," reduces the nonsettling defendants' liability by the amount of the settle-
ment, but does not allow contribution. Nonsettling defendants are liable for the
full damages awarded to the plaintiff, reduced by any settlement amounts. 8
The Court unanimously adopted the final rule, "pro rata" allocation, though it
elected to refer to it as "proportionate share" allocation. 9
Under the proportionate share approach, a defendant that settles extin-
guishes its own future liability and reduces other defendants' liabilities by its
"equitable share" of damages.60 Nonsettling defendants remain liable for their
50. Id. at 1075-76.
51. Id. at 1079-80.
52. Id. at 1080-81.
53. See McDermott, 511 U.S. at 204 (stating that the question presented is the calculation
of a nonsettling defendant's liability).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 208-09 (stating that no consensus exists regarding apportionment problems,
as evinced by the Restatement's varied positions on the matter).
57. Id. at 208 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A(!) (1977)).
58. Id. at 208-09 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A(2) (1977)).
59. Id. at 217. "Pro rata" apportionment is the same as proportionate share apportion-
ment. Id. at 210 n.9.
60. Id. at 209 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A(3) (1977)). A dcfen-
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own proportionate shares of damages.61 River Don's assessed liability was
38%, so River Don should pay 38% of the $2.1 million verdict.62 The Fifth
Circuit had also held that AmClyde was immune to McDermott's claim for
damages because of an agreement between the two that waived liability. 63
The parties did not raise the issue of River Don's responsibility for
AmClyde's share of damages, and the Court did not consider it-nor did it
consider the liability of other parties for AmClyde's share.1
Three considerations were "paramount" in the Court's selection of an
apportionment scheme: (1) consistency with the principle of proportionate
fault, (2) promotion of settlement, and (3) judicial economy.65 With regard
to judicial economy, the Court found pro tanto with contribution inferior to
the other two approaches because it encourages additional contribution
litigation." Moreover, because pro tanto with contribution leaves settling
defendants open to future contribution claims, the Court felt that it would not
encourage litigants to settle.67
Deciding between the proportionate share and pro tanto without contribu-
tion mechanisms, the Court focused on the rules' consistency with comparative
fault. The Court reasoned that the proportionate share approach is more
consistent with proportionate fault because, unlike pro tanto without contribu-
tion, nonsettling defendants never pay more or less than their equitable shares
of damages. 61 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that, because trial uncertainty
and the plaintiff's desire for "war chest" funds normally reduce settlement
values to less than the amounts of verdicts rendered at trial, using pro tanto
apportionment without contribution likely would result in settling defendants
paying less than their equitable shares of damages. 69 Though "good faith"
hearings could help ensure that partial settlements are accurate reflections of
dant's "equitable share" is that portion of damages that corresponds with the defendant's
proportionate fault. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 886A cmt. h (1977).
61. McDermott, 511 U.S. at210.
62. Id.
63. McDermott, Inc. v. Clyde Iron, 979 F.2d 1068, 1076 (5th Cir. 1993), rev'd sub nom.,
McDermott, 511 U.S. at 202.
64. McDermott, 511 U.S. at 210 n.1O.
65. Id. at 211.
66. Id. at 212.
67. See id. at 211-12 (reasoning that settlement can "only disadvantage" a settlor with
contribution claims in the future or with overpayment in the present).
68. See id. at 212 (reasoning that, under pro tanto without contribution, nonsettling
defendants will "frequently" be liable for more than their equitable shares).
69. See id. at 213 (reasoning that settlement amounts are likely less than a defendant's
equitable share of damages because they reflect future uncertainty and can be used to finance
further litigation by a plaintiff).
NAVIGATING THE STRAITS OF SETTLEMENT AND INSOLVENCY 633
a defendant's liability, the Court concluded that these hearings would not
"fully remove" potential inequity because experience in other courts showed
that they are normally "cursory."7 That a plaintiff's success at trial is uncer-
tain further compounded the use of hearings. 1
The Court felt that pro tanto without contribution would encourage early
settlement by allowing early-settling defendants to pay less than their equita-
ble shares of damages.72 At the same time, this incentive to settle is at the
expense of nonsettling defendants, who remain liable for all damages less the
amounts of the low, early settlements." While public policy should encourage
settlement, doing so at the expense of nonsettling parties is "too high a price
in unfairness." '74 The Court found that other factors--the cost of litigation, the
desire to avoid uncertainty, and the maintenance of commercial relation-
ships-normally provide "sufficient" incentives to settle.75
The Court also concluded that proportionate share allocation better serves
judicial economy. The "potential for unfairness" in pro tanto without contri-
bution (in that some defendants settle for less than their shares because other
defendants have "deep pockets") necessitates "good faith" hearings.76 These
hearings require district courts to predict a settling defendant's "fair share" of
damages long before trial." Though courts must determine the relative faults
of parties at some point, the Court felt that reserving the determination for trial
would save judicial time for two reasons." First, all parties may settle before
trial, negating the need for any determination.79 Second, determining settled
parties' relative faults at trial, in addition to determining the fault of the
nonsettling defendants, may consume "little or no additional trial time." ' The
70. Id. at213-14.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 215 (reasoning that pro tanto without contribution encourages parties to





76. See id. at 216 (noting that, because of potential unfairness, no party or amicus
advocates pro tanto allocation without contribution unless coupled with good faith hearings).
77. See id. at 216-17 (noting that while a court must determine a settling party's fault at
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nonsettling parties likely need to describe the role of all defendants "to pro-
vide context for the dispute.""1
Ultimately, the Court came to consider the interplay between joint and
several liability in Edmonds and its adoption of proportionate share apportion-
ment. The Court maintained that "no tension" exists between joint and several
liability and proportionate share allocation, just as the adoption of comparative
fault did not abrogate joint and several liability principles.8 2 Edmonds "merely
reaffirm[s]" joint and several liability, which can "result in one defendant[]
paying more than its apportioned share of liability when the plaintiff's recov-
ery from other defendants is limited by factors beyond the plaintiff's control,
such as a defendant's insolvency. '8 3 The Court went on to state: "When the
limitations on the plaintiff's recovery arise from outside forces, joint and
several liability makes the other defendants, rather than an innocent plaintiff,
responsible for the shortfall."' 4 A settlement is not a limitation on the plain-
tiff's recovery "by outside forces, but by [the plaintiff's] own agreement to
settle."' Thus, Edmonds "did not [even] address the issue in this case, the
effect of a settlement on nonsettling defendants."8
C. The Collision over Judgment-Proof Defendants
The progress of knowledge sometimes requires that we look not to what
has been said, but rather, to what those statements discuss in the first place. 7
Arguably, the McDermott Court's adoption of pro rata apportionment creates
81. Id.
82. Id. at 220.
83. Id. at 220-21 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at221.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 220.
87. An allusion to cultural icon Ken Kesey illustrates this theme:
The answer is never the answer. What's really interesting is the mystery. If you
seek the mystery instead of the answer, you'll always be seeking. I've never seen
anybody really find the answer-they think they have, so they stop thinking. But
the job is to seek mystery, evoke mystery, plant a garden in which strange plants
grow and mysteries bloom. The need for mystery is greater than the need for an
answer.
These words, attributed to Kesey, appeared on the programs distributed at his November 14,
2001 funeral. M.L. Lyke, Ken Kesey Goes Out in Proper Tie-Dye, SEATLR POST-r-TEInGEN-
cER, Nov. 15, 2001, at Al. One can find the quote in its entirety at http://www.intrepidtrips.
corn (last visited February 23, 2003). For a thought-provoking account of Ken Kesey's exploits
during the 1960s, see Washington and Lee alumnus Tom Wolfe's excellent book, THE ELECTRIC
KoOL-AiD AcD TEST (1968).
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more questions than it answers when some defendants can't pay." This Note
uses the following hypothetical example to help clarify the nature of the
problem and its resolution. Suppose that Adam owns a crane that Becky
manufactured and sold directly to Adam. This crane uses steel cable that
Cindy manufactured and also sold to Adam. At the time Adam bought the
crane and cable, both Becky and Cindy recommended the use of Cindy's steel
cable with Becky's crane. After the sale, Cindy realizes that her steel cable
is very susceptible to corrosion and should not be used in waterfront applica-
tions. Cindy notifies Becky, but not Adam. Becky, in turn, realizes that she
has advised Adam to use Cindy's cabling on the crane and warns Adam to
replace the Cindy-manufactured cable with one of several alternate brands
immediately. Adam ignores Becky's warning, and two years later a corroded
cable breaks and severely injures Paul, a longshoreman in Adam's employ.
Paul sues Adam, Becky, and Cindy, and all three defendants assert that Paul
is comparatively negligent. In addition, Adam asserts immunity under
LI-1WCA as a defense. Before trial, Becky settles with Paul for $250,000. At
trial, the jury apportions liability 40% to Adam, 30% to Becky, and 20% to
Cindy, with 10% comparative fault to Paul. The jury awards $1 million in
damages. Were there no settlements and no claims of immunity, the mechan-
ics of contribution would make Adam pay $400,000, Becky $300,000, and
Cindy $200,000.9 However, because Adam is judgment-proof, Becky and
Cindy are jointly liable for Adam's share of the damages ($400,000). Nor-
mally, the question would be one of how to divide Adam's share of damages
between Becky and Cindy. However, Becky has settled and is no longer liable
as a party. Does Cindy, herself only 20% responsible for Paul's injuries, pay
60% of Paul's damages? Or does Paul's settlement with Becky extinguish any
joint liability on Cindy's party, leaving her responsible only for her 20%?
The holdings of McDermott and Edmonds, representing the amalgam-
ation of comparative fault and joint and several liability, stand ambiguous to
the resolution of this problem. Though the decisions advocate joint and
several liability when factors beyond the plaintiff's control limit recovery,9°
88. See Eric M. Danoff, Settlement Credit and Contribution Under Maritime Law: The
Effect of McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 7 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 187, 201 (1994) (noting that joint
and several liability "does not always square" with the McDermott Court's proportionate fault
goals); Lea & Bridger, supra note 12, at 275 (noting that most commentators on apportionment
methods raise the problem of insolvent defendants).
89. Although Paul can execute his $900,000 judgment ($1 million less 10% comparative
negligence) against any of the three jointly and severally liable defendants, any defendant forced
to pay more than its proportionate share of damages can seek contribution from the others.
Thus, after the contribution actions conclude, each party will have paid its proportionate share
of the judgment.
90. See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 220-21 (1994) (holding that
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McDermott also provides that a plaintiffs act of settlement is not such an
"involuntary" factor.91 In a footnote discussion, the McDermott Court noted
that one party's inability to pay damages "might be thought" to make the
remaining at-trial defendants liable for that party's share of damages. 2
However, the Court then stated that it felt the "best way of viewing" the
contractual provision limiting AmClyde's prospective liability was as a "quasi
settlement in advance of any tort claims," thus not implicating the other
defendants' obligation to cover a judgment-proof defendant's share of dam-
ages.93 Looking to the allocative principles at work in the Court's decisions,
this Note now delves into the legal views underlying the Court's joint and
several liability and pro rata apportionment pronouncements. The amalgam-
ated approach labeled limited joint and several liability develops from this
framework of underlying principles.
III. Partial Settlements as Proportionate Pieces of the Expected Pie
A. Settlements as Expected (vis-4-vis Actual) Damages
Partial settlements are not "dollar for dollar" equivalents of a settling
defendant's actual share of damages at trial, 94 and the Court recognized this
fact in choosing the proportionate share rule.95 According to the McDermott
Court, the disparity between pretrial settlement amounts and damages
awarded at trial results from trial uncertainty and the plaintiff's interest in
obtaining "war chest" funds to finance continued litigation against remaining
defendants.' Commentators have identified a number of additional factors
that discount settlements: litigation costs, risk aversion, informational inaccu-
racies, the structure and timing of settlement offers, and parties' knowledge
Edmonds "merely reaffirm[s] the well-established principle of joint and several liability," which
requires one defendant to pay more than its proportionate share of damages when "factors
beyond the plaintiff's control" limit a plaintiff's recovery).
91. See id. at 221 (stating that limitations on a plaintiff's recovery because of settlement
are not "outside forces").
92. See id. at 210 n.10 (stating that, while principles of joint and several liability and
Edmonds could be seen to mandate this result, the plaintiff has not requested that the defendant
pay more than its individual, proportionate share of the damages).
93. See id. (stating that under such a view a proportionate credit approach "takes into
account" this "quasi settlement").
94. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILY § 16 cmt. c
(2000) ("[Most settlements are discounted by the estimated probability of liability of the
settling tortfeasor and, to some extent, for the costs and fees saved .... ").
95. See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 213 (1994) (noting that settlements
normally do not "reflect an entirely accurate prediction of the outcome of a trial").
96. Id.
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of other settlement offers and of other parties' financial solvency. 97 The time
value of money-the idea that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar
tomorrow-also discounts settlements. 9  To a litigant, then, a settlement
payment intrinsically outweighs a verdict of equal amount because the settle-
ment payment is certain (as opposed to uncertain) and immediate (as opposed
to prospective).99
While a defendant's settlement may not accurately reflect the total
damages assessed against the defendant at trial, the settlement still reflects the
parties' expectations about the individual defendant's probable obligation to
the plaintiff.10° Thus, the settlement represents the expected value of the
settling defendant's share of damages at the time of settlement.101 Close
analysis reveals that the Supreme Court's concern about the "unfairness" of
pro tanto allocation stems from the disparity between actual and expected
damages."° Because of both the uncertainty of success at trial and the plain-
97. See Lewis A. Komhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Settlements Under Joint and Several
Liability, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 427, 458-64 (1993) (detailing the potential role of these factors
in the economic modeling of settlement negotiations).
98. See RICHARDA. PosER, ECONOMIC ANALYSTS OF LAW § 21.5, at 613 (5th ed. 1998)
(discussing how discount rates affect settlement by generally increasing the stakes of maintain-
ing litigation, but also noting that relative discount rates between the plaintiff and the defendant
may differ).
99. See id. (noting that the discount rate is related to the probability of success because
"[d]elay increases uncertainty" and thus both decreases the probability of success and increases
the discount rate).
100. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfield, Economic Anaysis of Legal Disputes
and Their Resolution, 27 J. EcON. LrITERATURE 1067, 1076 (1989) (reasoning that economic
modeling anticipates disparity between expected lawsuit values and actual verdict amounts
because the subjective value equals expected damages multiplied by the subjective probability
of award); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 113, 116-18 (1996) (reasoning that settlement values reflect both probabilities of success
at trial and parties' risk preferences, but that litigants may make "suboptimal" settlement
decisions because of other factors). Cooter and Rubinfield also note that risk aversion may
further increase this disparity. See Cooter & Rubinfield, supra, at 1076 (reasoning that trial is
a "gamble" and thus the subjective value to risk-adverse participants differs from the expected
value).
101. Much of the law and economics literature implicitly assumes a divergence between
actual verdicts and parties' subjective values during settlement. See POSNER, supra note 98,
§ 21.5, at 609-11 (evaluating the discrepancy between at-trial judgments and parties' subjective,
pre-trial settlement valuations on the bases of subjective probabilities of success, litigation costs,
discount rates, and degrees of risk aversion).
102. See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 213-14 (1994) (stating that even
when liability can be accurately determined in advance of trial, the uncertainty of trial can make
pro tanto allocation visit "substantial unfairness" on nonsettling defendants).
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tiffs interest in obtaining proceeds mimediately, the Court felt that settle-
ments do not reflect the actual damages that juries award at trial.103
The distinction between viewing settlements as reflective of actual
damages and viewing them as reflective of expected damages is crucial.
Using the dollar amount of a verdict as the measure of a defendant's responsi-
bility yields systemically biased results because (among other reasons) many
settled claims would never ultimately result in verdicts for plaintiffs. Because
many suits never result in verdicts at all-there are summary judgment dis-
missals, settlements, and defense verdicts-saying that any particular claim
would have netted X-dollars at trial presupposes too much. If settlements do
not reflect actual, at-trial damages, then deducting settlement amounts from
verdicts results in disproportionate (and thus, unfair) allocations of damages
to nonsettling defendants."' Significantly, even some jurisdictions that use
pro tanto allocation recognize that damages expected at the time of a settle-
ment may differ substantially from the actual damages found at trial"1 5 Thus,
to effectuate a division of damages that is actually proportionate to fault, the
dollar amount of pretrial settlements cannot be the "ruler" in a post-verdict
entry of judgment against nonsettling defendants.
B. Allocating Discounting Factors Among the Parties
The real unfairness of pro tanto apportionment is that it places the risk
of deviation between actual and expected damages not on the parties to a
settlement agreement, but rather, on the defendants that are not parties to the
agreement." A return to the previous hypothetical illustrates this, 17 although
103. Id. at 213.
104. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB=IrY § 16 cmt. c
(2000) (reasoning that pro tanto allocation is unfair because settlement amounts are normally
less than actual damages assessed at trial); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 886A cmt. m
(1977) (stating that pro tanto apportionment provides a "clear incentive" for collusion and that
it can be "very unfair" to other tortfeasors); see also Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde &
Assocs., 698 P.2d 159, 166 (Cal. 1985) (finding that a "good faith" settlement hearing should
consider the amount of the settlement relative to the settling defendant's share of the plaintiffs
expected damages, but that courts should recognize that settling parties pay less than they would
if found liable at trial); River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498, 503
(Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (noting that pro tanto apportionment is "vulnerable to abuse" because a
plaintiff can select certain defendants to bear disproportionate shares of damages).
105. See Tech-Bilt, 698 P.2d at 167 (stating that "practical considerations" require the
evaluation of the reasonableness of a settlement amount on the basis of the information
available at the time of the settlement).
106. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 16 cmt. c
(2000) (stating that a disadvantage of pro tanto allocation is that it imposes settlement inadequa-
cies on nonsettling tortfeasors and that pro tanto allocation usually increases the liabilities of
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for simplicity this discussion assumes that Adam is not judgment-proof. If the
case goes to trial and no one settles, Adam pays $400,000, Becky pays
$300,000, and Cindy pays $20 0 ,0 00 .l1 However, before trial occurs, no one
knows: (1) what verdict the jury will return, (2) how the jury will allocate
fault among the parties, and (3) whether any other party will actually be able
to pay damages if a court enters judgment against it. Because of these uncer-
tainties, suppose that Adam and Paul settle before trial for $300,000. Trial
results in the aforementioned $1 million verdict with liability apportioned
40% to Adam, 30% to Becky, and 20% to Cindy. In a pro tanto regime,
Becky and Cindy together pay $600,000: the $900,000 "net" verdict less the
$300 000 that Adam paid in settlement. Thus, Becky pays 60%
(30 % + 20./9) of the $600,000, or $360,000: $60,000 more than she
would have paid if all parties had proceeded to trial. In contrast, under the
proportionate share rule Becky pays only her share (30%) of the verdict,
$300,000: the Adam-Paul settlement does not affect Becky's liability.
Discounting factors mean that settlements typically are lower than
damages awarded at trial; thus, a regime of pro tanto apportionment generally
increases nonsettling defendants' expected liabilities."0 9 On the other hand,
if the settling parties underestimate Adam's relative fault or the amount of
damages, then the Adam-Paul settlement might actually benefit Becky under
pro tanto allocation. If the jury awards $800,000 and finds Adam 20%
responsible, Becky 30% responsible, and Cindy 40% responsible, Becky pays
$240,000 in the absence of a settlement agreement. Because Adam and Paul
have settled for $300,000, under pro tanto apportionment Becky and Cindy are
only liable for $420,000: $720,000 ($800,000 less 10% comparative negli-
nonsettling tortfeasors); Daniel Klerman, Settling Multidefendant Lawsuits: The Advantage of
Conditional Setoff Rules, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 445, 451-52 (1996) (reasoning that, under pro
tanto apportionment, settlement with one defendant leaves the nonsettling defendant "with a
larger expected liability" than if both parties went to trial).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89 (detailing hypothetical example).
108. This hypothetical continues to assume that a joint defendant satisfying the judgment
will pursue contribution from the other tortfeasors. Thus, all defendants ultimately pay their
proportionate shares.
109. Cf Frank H. Easterbrook et al., Contribution AmongAntitrust Defendants: A Legal
and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. & EcoN. 331, 356-60 (1980) (demonstrating that under a rule
of no contribution, codefendants' settlements increase the expected liabilities of nonsettling
defendants and inferentially supporting the proposition that failing to deduct a settled defen-
dant's proportionate share of damages increases the nonsettling defendants' expected liabilities).
The McDermott Court entertains a similar calculus to demonstrate the attractiveness of settle-
ment to plaintiffs under pro tanto apportionment. McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202,
214 n.20 (1994). McDermott also illustrates the "potential for unfairness" to nonsettling
codefendants under a pro tanto rule. Id. at 212 n.14.
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gence) less the $300,000 prior settlement. Becky pays 42.9%
(30Y0/'30% + 40%) of $420,000, or $180,000, which is $60,000 less than she
would have paid had Adam and Paul not settled. Thus, in this situation, the
Adam-Paul settlement agreement benefits Becky, instead of increasing her
liability or allocating the surplus of the bargain back to Adam.
The source of the inequity between pro tanto and pro rata allocation is
the fundamental difference between expected loss and actual loss: settled
defendant Adam's expected loss is subtracted from the actual verdict.1 '
Proportionate share apportionment, on the other hand, subtracts Adam's actual
share of damages (40%) from the verdict. Becky's at-trial liability remains
the same under a proportionate share system.
Based on the foregoing discussion, we can say that the amount a defen-
dant pays at trial (assuming there are no settlements) is a function of the
damages found by a jury and that defendant's relative culpability. Thus:
P. =D f.
where P. is the amount that defendant a pays, D is the total amount of dam-
ages awarded by a jury, andf is a's proportionate share of fault. If damages
are $100 and a is 50% at-fault, then a will pay 50% of $100, or $50. On the
other hand, the amount the parties expect a to pay at trial is:
E[Po] = E[D] -E[f/] 'po" r
where E[Po] is a's expected payment, E[D] is the expected amount of total
damages, E[fo] is a's expected share of fault, p. is the probability of prevailing
against a, and r is the discount rate applied to the future payment to reflect the
time value of money."' Thus, if the parties correctly expect damages to be
110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABIxrY § 16 cmt. c
(2000) (stating that a plaintiff and a settling tortfeasor effectively "externalize" a part of the
settling tortfeasor's liability to nonsettling tortfeasors); see also McDermott, 511 U.S. at 214
(stating that pro tanto apportionment "is likely to lead to inequitable apportionments of
liability"); cf CHARLES 0. GREGORY, LEGISLATIVE Loss DIsTRiBuTIoN IN NEGuGENCE Ac-
TIONS; A STUDYINADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF COMPARATIVE NEOLIGENCE AND CoNTRIBU-
TION IN TORT LITIGATION 77 (1936) (showing that when a plaintiff secures a joint and several
verdict against one defendant, the plaintiff transfers the risk of insolvency entirely to that
defendant thus showing that a partial settlement under a pro tanto regime transfers risk from
the settling parties to the nonsettling parties).
111. Scholars examining the expected value of a lawsuit generally view this value as a
function of the expected amount of damages and the expected proportion of fault. See POSNER,
supra note 98, § 21.5 (examining parties' decision to settle or proceed to trial as a function of
the amount of the judgment and the subjective probability of prevailing against a defendant, but
subtracting costs). Judge Posner elsewhere considers the time value of money an appropriate
discounting factor. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and
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$100 and correctly expect a's share of fault to be 50%, then the present value
of the claim depends on the probability that the plaintiff can prevail at all and
on the discount rate applied to reflect uncertainty. A 0.9 chance of prevailing
on the merits and a discount rate of 0.8 means that the present value of a's
future claim payment is $36 (E[D] • E[f,] "p." r = $100. 0.5 0.9. 0.8).
Assuming instead a situation with two defendants, a and b, the total
payments made by the defendants (P) are:
P=D .f.+D .f6
And the expected value of the total payments to the plaintiff is:
E[P] =E[D] E[fo] • po r + E[D]" E[] "p6 r
How do things change if someone settles? If b settles and the only defendants
to the suit are a and b, then a pays the total judgment against the defendants,
less the settlement offset:
P. = P -offset = D "f. +D 'fb -offset
Assuming that plaintiffs never settle for less than, and defendants never pay
more than, the expected value of claims," 2 defendant b's settlement will be:
EIPb] = E[D]' Ef] "Pb' r
In other words, after discounting the anticipated award to reflect uncer-
tainty and the time value of money, the parties will not agree to a settlement
that is more or less than the present value of the amount they actually expect
to change hands at trial. Under a pro tanto regime, the court offsets this
settlement amount from the payment made by the remaining defendant:
P. = P -E[Pb] = D" (f. +fb) -E[D]- Ef] pb ' r
Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 417 (1973) (reasoning that plaintiff's offer is
a function of the "present value" of the judgment). On the other hand, economically oriented
legal analyses sometimes do not consider costs as a factor on account of simplicity. See Lewis
A. Komhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Multidefendant Settlements: The Impact of Joint and
Several Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STuD. 41, 71 (1994) (restricting inquiry by excluding costs "[flor
simplicity"). This Note's analysis focuses on the impact of allocation mechanisms on the
amounts of damages that parties expect to pay at trial. Though costs are undoubtedly a critical
factor in whether or not the parties do, in fact, decide to proceed to trial, they do not directly
contribute to the amount of damages assessed against a defendant at trial, and this Note
accordingly excludes them from inquiry. For another scholar's analysis of the expected cost of
a lawsuit, considering this cost to be a function of the amount of damages and the probability
of prevailing with costs subtracted, see A. MITCHELL POUINSKY, AN INrRODUCTIoN TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS 107-09 (2d ed. 1989).
112. This again assumes that contribution claims will equitably adjust the amounts paid
by the defendants. Supra note 108.
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Assuming that the parties' expectations regarding damages and proportionate
fault are accurate (that is, E[D] = D and E[fb] =fb), then we can simplify a's
payment as:
P. =P - E[Pb] =D "f. +f " (I -Pb r)
At trial, a will pay all of the damages attributed to it (D .f.) and also will pay
the portion of b's damages not paid by b in settlement due to uncertainty
(D *fb" (1 - Pb r)). Thus, if there is a 0.9 chance of prevailing against b and
a 0.8 discount rate applied to the settlement payment, then a will pay 28% (1
- .72) of the amount that b would have paid at trial (D "fb). Defendant b's
settlement with the plaintiff thus increases a's at-trial payment to the tune of
D "fb (1 -Pb r).
If projections regarding damages or proportionate fault prove inaccurate,
the at-trial defendant similarly bears the burden:
P. = P - E[Pb] = D" (f. +fb) - E[D]" Ef] "Pb" r
Thus, if the pre-trial expectations are that a and b are equally liable for a $ 100
obligation, the probability factor is the aforementioned 0.9, and the discount
rate is the aforementioned 0.8, then b will pay up to $36 (E[D] E[f] • Pb" r
= $100 0.5 0.9 0.8) in settlement. However, if a factfinder apportions 60%
of the fault to b and awards $120 in damages, then besides a's share of the
judgment (D f. = .4 $120 = $48), a will also pay D "fb - E[D]" E[fI] "Pb"
r, or the difference between b's at-trial share (D "fb = $120 0.6 = $72) and
what b paid in settlement (E[D] E[f], "Pb db = $100" 0.5 0.9" 0.8 = $36).
Here, a pays $84 when it is but 40% liable for a $120 judgment.
In contrast, the pro rata rule uses b's actual share of damages as the
measure of offset. Thus, in a pro rata regime, a's at-trial payment is:
P. =P- offset =P-Pb =D . +D'fA -D "fb =D .f.
What does it all mean? It means that the end-result difference between pro
tanto and proportionate share apportionment is whether nonsettling defendant
a pays the shortfall between b's expected and at-trial shares of damages,
represented as D 'fb - E[D] " E[f] "Pb r.
Once one understands the choice between the pro tanto and pro rata rules
as a choice between the setoff of expected versus actual damages,
McDermott's selection of proportionate share apportionment supports two
propositions. First, the selection shows that settlement reflects a party's
expected liability at trial. Because expectations and actualities differ," 3 a
113. See McDermott, 511 U.S. at 213 (reasoning that settlements normally do not reflect
"entirely accurate" predictions of trial outcomes).
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settlement with a defendant for expected damages eliminates all damages that
would be taxed to the settling defendant at trial."
4
Second, the result of proportionate share allocation is that partial settle-
ments limit joint and several liability's application."' Under a pro tanto
scheme, nonsettling defendants are responsible for the entire amount of a
judgment, less a credit for the amounts of the settlements. Substantively, pro
tanto apportionment results in nonsettling defendants remaining jointly liable
in that they may be forced to pay settled defendants' bargained-away shares
of uncertainty. Under proportionate share apportionment, the plaintiff's
voluntary act of partial settlement completely excuses the settling defendant
by barring contribution. Thus, the liability for the share of damages that
would go to the settling party becomes several, while the nonsettlors remain
jointly liable for their collectively allocated shares of damages." 6 The risk of
inaccurate settlement lies with the parties making the settlement; as the
McDermott Court stated, "nonsettling defendants pay no more than their share
of the judgment." 17
IV Fulfilling Expectations: Imputing Uncollectible Shares
to Prior Settlements
A. Limited Joint and Several Liability
A plaintiffs act of partial settlement is a limitation on recovery within the
plaintiff's control; thus, it destroys the joint and several relationship among the
remaining defendants."' Nevertheless, a tortfeasor's inability to pay damages
is beyond the plaintiff's control, so other defendants must cover the judgment-
proof defendant's shortfall." 9 Thus, when both voluntary and involuntary
114. Cf id. at 212 (stating that, under proportionate share allocation, a nonsettling
defendant pays only its proportionate share of a judgment, whereas under a pro tanto system a
settlement for less than a defendant's equitable share "requires the nonsettling defendant to pay
more than its share").
115. See id. at 221 (stating that settlement is not a limitation on a plaintiff's recovery due
to "outside forces" and, thus, that joint and several liability does not implicate nonsettling
codefendants for the "shortfall"); see also id. at 220 (stating that "no inconsistency" exists
between joint and several liability and proportionate share apportionment).
116. See id. (noting that, in the case of settlement, a plaintiff's recovery is limited only by
the plaintiff's decision to settle with a defendant).
117. Id. at 209.
118. See id. at 221 (stating that "no reason" exists to allocate a recovery "shortfall" to
nonsettling defendants when a plaintiff negotiates a partial settlement).
119. See id. (stating that joint and several liability can make one defendant pay more than
its proportionate share of damages when a plaintiff's recovery is limited by factors beyond the
plaintiff's control); Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256,269 (1979)
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factors limit a plaintiff's recovery, the logically consistent solution calls for an
amalgamation ofjoint liability and several liability: the nonsettling tortfeasors
remain jointly and severally liable with respect to the involuntary limitation on
recovery, but the nonsettling defendants are only severally liable for the
voluntary factors that limit recovery. Stated differently, a court should appor-
tion damages to replicate the allocation that would result for the nonsettlors
(after contribution) had no settlement occurred. The court never enters judg-
ment against the settled parties, but instead divides the judgment-proof defen-
dant's share of damages among all of the defendants that are not judgment-
proof. The court presumes that the prior settlements incorporated the settling
defendants' shares of the judgment-proof defendant's shortfall. For simplicity,
this Note labels this method of damages apportionment "limited joint and
several liability."
Though this approach reconciles the inherent conflict that occurs when
joint and several liability's application depends on whether limitations are
"voluntary" or "involuntary,"'20 the chief advantage of this approach is that,
properly applied, it best preserves the parties' expectations. Defendants that
proceed to trial do not pay more simply because other defendants settled.
Significantly, the Third Restatement of Torts essentially adopts this approach
for systems of"pure" joint and several liability, though in a somewhat different
form.
Under the limited joint and several liability approach, a factfinder first
allocates fault to all parties-litigating defendants, defendants that have
settled, defendants that are insolvent, and defendants that are immune to
judgment-and then proportionally reallocates the fault assessed to a
judgment-proof defendant among the other defendants. The earlier hypotheti-
(holding that a codefendant is liable for "all" damages, "yet its negligence may have been only
a minor cause of the injury"); see also supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text (discussing
Edmonds's elaboration of a codefendant's joint liability for an immune tortfeasor's share of
damages).
120. Recall that the McDermott Court suggested that the issue was one of whether recovery
limitations were "voluntary" or "involuntary." McDermott's dicta does not resolve how one
should characterize the situation in which one defendant is judgment-proof and some of the
parties have partially settled. Compare McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 211 n.10
(1994) (stating that "[i]t might be thought" that joint and several liability and Edmonds make
a nonsettling party liable for all damages less the plaintiff's share and the settling defendant's
share) with id. at 221 ("Unlike the rule in Edmonds, the proportionate share rule announced in
this opinion applies when there has been a settlement. In such cases, the plaintiff's recovery
against the settling defendant has been limited not by outside forces, but by its own agreement
to settle. There is no reason to allocate any shortfall to the other defendants, who were not
parties to the settlement."). This Note's conclusion returns to this point.
121. Cf id. at 212 (stating that a chief advantage of proportionate share allocation is that
"a litigating defendant ordinarily pays only its proportionate share of the judgment").
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cal example illustrates this apportionment scheme.'22 If all parties proceed to
trial, Adam, Becky, and Cindy are jointly and severally liable for $900,000.
If Paul collects the $900,000 judgment from Becky, Becky will attempt to
recover $600,000 from Adam and Cindy. However, because Adam is immune
to Paul's claim, only Cindy can pay. Under the "pure" joint and several
scheme of the maritime law, Becky and Cindy must collectively pay the
damages assessed to all defendants. Thus, the court's first step is to allocate
the $900,000 between Becky and Cindy.
Becky and Cindy collectively bear 50% of the total allocated fault.
Compared to one another, Becky bears 60% (300/50%) responsibility andindmbars0toone ,
a (20 01% ) responsibility. Becky will collect $360,000
(40% of $900,000) from Cindy, so Becky will, in the end, pay a net of
$540,000 (60% of $900,000 or $900,000 - $360,000).
When a court adjudicates a partially settled suit, it should render judg-
ments against the nonsettling defendants to replicate this result. If Cindy had
settled with Paul instead of proceeding to trial, then the court should not enter
the $900,000 joint and several judgment against Adam, Becky, and Cindy, but
instead should enter judgment against Becky for the amount she would have
ultimately paid: $540,000. Thus, Becky pays her own share of the damages
($300,000) plus her share of judgment-proof Adam's damages ($240,000).
The Third Restatement achieves a close result by removing the judgment-
proof defendant from the factfinder's damage apportionment.123 In the hypo-
thetical example, the jury would allocate fault among only Becky, Cindy, and
Paul. However, because the risk of a defendant being judgment-proof falls
solely on the defendants in a "pure" joint and several regime, the Restatement
suggests that a factfinder first consider the fault of all defendants (judgment-
proof or not) to determine the plaintiff's comparative responsibility.'24 The
factfinder then re-considers the fault among only the defendants, but without
regard to the judgment-proof defendant.1 2 Thus, the jury would consider
122. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89 (detailing hypothetical example).
123. See RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENTOFLIAB. §A19 cmt. e (2000)
(stating that regime of "pure" joint and several liability "does not permit" a factfinder to allocate
liability to any defendants that are immune to judgment); see also id. § A19 cmt. b, reporters'
note (clarifying that "parties" included in a factfinder's apportionment are only those that are
parties to the suit and that are further "bound by the judgment in it"). Whether or not this
"bound by the judgment" language means that the allocation should include bankrupt defen-
dants, against whom litigation is stayed, is unclear.
124. See id. § Al 9 cmt. e (stating that "the jury [should] initially decide any comparative
share of responsibility for the plaintiff in reference to all other[]" defendants, whether parties
to the suit or not).
125. See id. (stating that after determining plaintiff's comparative fault, the factfmder
"apportion[s] the remaining responsibility to [the party] defendants").
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Paul's fault relative to Adam, Becky, and Cindy and find Paul 10% compara-
tively at-fault. Next, the jury would consider the split of fault between Becky
and Cindy only. Presumably, the jury would find Becky and Cindy culpable
in the same proportions, so they would still pay $540,000 and $360,000,
respectively, in the end.
However, removing a judgment-proof defendant from the jury's alloca-
tion of fault can be problematic. The reporters' note to the Restatement admits
that "[iln theory, it might be preferable to submit immune parties for an assign-
ment of responsibility," but cites "administrative inefficiencies entailed" as a
weightier, countervailing interest." 6 Specifically, the "administrative ineffi-
ciencies" are the costs associated with "discover[ing] and try[ing] the responsi-
bility of a nonparty."'27 However, considerations that the Restatement either
does not consider or does not fully consider weigh in favor of inclusion: the
uncertainty of whether or not a party will become judgment-proof, the need for
the allocation in other contexts, and an accurate allocation by the jury in the
first instance.
To start, the Restatement approach is not a "one size fits all" garment. A
plaintiff may be litigating against three joint defendants, but suppose one files
for bankruptcy during or after trial. At such a late point, simply removing this
defendant's share from the factfinder's allocation is impossible; the choice
facing the court is reallocation or retrial.12 Reallocation, a matter of arithme-
tic, is clearly preferable to trying the entire case all over again. Moreover,
what if a defendant with a bankruptcy stay loses that stay? 29 If codefendants
have paid an outstanding judgment that does not consider the fault of the
previously judgment-proof defendant, ancillary contribution litigation must
determine the liability of that defendant anew.
126. Id. § A19 cmt. e, reporters' note.
127. Id. § C19 cmt. e. The comment also notes that "immunities" mean simply that a
"person has no duty or has not breached any duty as a matter of law" and that a court must "sort
out" these "immunities" from actual immunities. Id. Suffice it to say that summary judgment
is available to any defendant that owes or has breached no duty as a matter of law. See gener-
a/l FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
128. For a published example, see Austin v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 841 F.2d 1184,
1186, 1196 (1 st Cir. 1988), in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reallocated
the 60% share of liability allocated to a defendant that had become bankrupt while an appeal
was pending.
129. For the uninitiated: Federal law "stays" proceedings against persons and entities that
file for bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000). Among other things, bankruptcy stays prevent
"the commencement or continuation" of actions against those filing for bankruptcy, as well as
the enforcement of judgments. Id. § 362(a)(1)-(2). There are a number of exceptions to
bankruptcy stays, e.g., id. § 362(b), and a court can end or modify a stay "for cause" or for other
reasons, id. § 362(d).
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But even when a bankrupt defendant does not lose its stay, codefendants
may attempt to recoup that defendant's share of the damages by asserting
contribution claims in the defendant's bankruptcy proceedings. 3° Clearly,
determining the judgment-proof defendant's share of damages will expedite
the joint tortfeasors' contribution claims. Additionally, other practical consid-
erations weigh in favor of including a judgment-proof defendant in a
factfinder's liability allocation. A shipowner, immune to its employees' tort
claims by operation of LHWCA, may assert an indemnification claim for
"maintenance and cure" benefits paid to its employee.' In such an instance,
whether or not the shipowner was itself negligent is relevant to the indemnity
action because it can negate or limit recovery; 2 making this determination at
trial can avoid unnecessary litigation in the future.'33
Finally-most importantly?-removing a culpable party from the alloca-
tion of fault can change that allocation.'34 That a jury finds that Adam, Becky,
130. For example, 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2000) allows claims for contribution under certain
circumstances.
131. "Maintenance and cure" is a shipowner's obligation to provide seamen who become
ill or suffer injury in the service of a vessel both per diem living allowances and payments for
medical expenses. Bertram v. Freeport McMoran, Inc., 35 F.3d 1008, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1994).
A shipowner must pay maintenance and cure benefits without regard to fault. Id. at 1012. A
shipowner forced to pay maintenance and cure benefits due to another's negligence may be able
to recover the payments from the negligent party. See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying
text (discussing tortfeasors' obligation to reimburse shipowners for maintenance and cure
payments).
132. See Knight v. Alaska Trawl Fisheries, Inc., 154 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that "Ryan indemnity," allowed by Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Al. S.S. Corp., 350
U.S. 124 (1956), is not available to a shipowner that is itself negligent). Other circuits have
held that a shipowner's negligence only reduces the shipowner's claim on a comparative basis,
id., or that it does not affect a shipowner's claim for Ryan indemnity at all, id. at 1045.
133. Cf McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202,211 (1994) (noting that a significant
drawback to pro tanto allocation is its tendency to create "unnecessary ancillary litigation").
134. See Chancy v. Falling Creek Metal Prods., Inc., 906 F.2d 1304, 1308 n.7 (8th Cir.
1990) (finding that district court should have included an immune party in the jury's liability
apportionment in order to clarify that immune party's role, and that the court afterwards should
have reallocated the immune party's share of damages to the other parties), see also Pierringer
v. Hoger, 124 N.W.2d 106, 111-12 (Wis. 1963) (stating that a nonsettling defendant's compara-
tive fault can only be determined "by a proper allocation of all the causal negligence"). The
Restatement explicitly considered this possibility. It notes:
The immune nonparty's share of comparative responsibility may not be assigned
to (and borne by) the parties in the same proportion as would have occurred if the
factfinder assigned comparative responsibility to the immune person and that share
were then realocated .... Nevertheless, the immune person's responsibility will
be apportioned among those who otherwise bear responsibility.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABuITY § C19 cmt. e (2000).
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and Cindy share fault in a 4:3:2 proportion does not mean that the same jury
will find that Becky and Cindy, compared without reference to Adam, share
fault in a 3:2 ratio. In fact, the relative culpabilities of Becky and Cindy, the
manufacturers of the crane and cable, respectively, likely will change when
one does not consider Adam's act of ignoring the warning that Becky, but not
Cindy, gave him. In fact, many maritime courts conclude that they must
allocate liability to judgment-proof defendants.13 The McDermott Court itself
reasoned that "parties will often need to describe the settling defendant's role
in order to provide context for the dispute," and suggested that such a determi-
nation would "require little or no additional trial time."'136 Thus, to whatever
extent "administrative inefficiencies" inure in including a judgment-proof
defendant, inefficiencies are equally present in not including a judgment-proof
defendant. A factfnder should include judgment-proof defendants because
this inclusion results in a more equitable result and often will be more efficient
in the long run.
B. Harmony with the Court's Settlement Considerations
The Court's pronounced "paramount" settlement concerns-consistency
with proportionate fault, the promotion of settlement, and judicial
economy 37 _are as good a place as any to begin analysis of limited joint and
several liability. How well does the approach reconcile these considerations?
With respect to the first consideration, the McDermott Court favored propor-
tionate share apportionment over the pro tanto method because pro tanto
apportionment was more likely to result in nonsettling defendants paying more
than their equitable shares of damages at trial. 3 In contrast, under propor-
tionate share allocation, "nonsettling defendants pay no more than their share
of the judgment.'
39
135. See, e.g., Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 61 F.3d 1113, 1116 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating
that liability should be apportioned to both an immune employer and a non-immune
codefendant); Geyer v. USX Corp., 896 F. Supp. 1440, 1446 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (ruling that the
need to apportion liability to all defendants does not prevent the dismissal of a settled party from
the action because liability can be apportioned to an "empty chair" defendant (quoting
McDermott, 511 U.S. at 217)); cf Harrison v. Garber Bros., Inc., 750 F. Supp. 203, 204 (E.D.
La. 1990) (ruling that a jury should both consider and determine a settled, nonparty tortfeasor's
share of relative fault); Bordelon v. Consol. Georex Geophysics, 628 F. Supp. 810, 812 (W.D.
La. 1986) (ruling that comparative fault cannot be determined without reference to an immune
party's culpability).
136. McDermott, 511 U.S. at 217.
137. Id. at 211.
138. See id. at 212 (reasoning that, under pro tanto allocation, a nonsettling defendant's
liability will "frequently" differ from its equitable share of damages).
139. Id. at 209.
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To be consistent with proportionate fault, then, an apportionment scheme
should divide a judgment-proof defendant's share of damages among the
settled and nonsettled codefendants as though no settlement had occurred at
all. Were the damages divided among the nonsettling defendants only, the
final result would run afoul of the command that "nonsettling defendants pay
no more than their share of the judgment.1 4 ° Nonsettling codefendants'
liabilities would increase as other defendants settled, the very evil the Court
sought to avoid in adopting proportionate share over pro tanto allocation.""
Were the damages not divided at all (in other words, if joint and several
liability simply terminated upon the occurrence of any settlement), the settle-
ment of one defendant would instead decrease the liabilities of the other
defendants,' 42 again obstructing the judicial goal that nonsettling tortfeasors
pay their proportionate shares of damages without regard to other parties'
settlements.143 Limited joint and several liability, in contrast, results in each
nonsettling defendant paying only the share of damages it would have paid
had all defendants gone to trial.
With respect to the second consideration, the promotion of settlement,'"
the Court reasoned that, although pro tanto apportionment (without the right
of contribution) would generally encourage settlement, that encouragement
would come as "a consequence of the inequity" present when some defendants
settle early, leaving others with a disproportionate share of the plaintiffs
damages.4 On the other hand, adopting pro tanto apportionment with the
right of contribution would have discouraged settlement because settlement
could "only disadvantage" a settling defendant: a low settlement would leave
the settling defendant open to future contribution claims,'46 and a high settle-
ment would leave the settlor paying too much, without a means of recouping
140. Id.
141. See id. at 212 (reasoning that pro tanto allocation is inconsistent with proportionate
fault allocation because a settlement with one defendant for less than its equitable share requires
the other defendants to pay more than their equitable shares).
142. Before the settlement, all defendants would be responsible for both their own shares
of the damages and the damages of the judgment-proof defendant. After the settlement,
defendants would be liable only for their own shares of damages, as the joint and several
relationship among the defendants would terminate.
143. See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 213 n.14 (1994) (stating that a
drawback of pro tanto allocation is that nonsettling defendants likely pay either more or less
than their equitable shares of damages).
144. Id. at211.
145. Id. at 214-15.
146. See id. at 211-12 (reasoning that nonsettling defendants can sue a settling defendant
for contribution).
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its losses. 47 Thus, a method of apportioning a judgment-proof defendant's
share of damages should insulate settlors from future liability. Otherwise, the
threat of contribution will diminish the incentive to settle. Nevertheless,
incentives to settle cannot come at the expense of nonsettling parties. Limited
joint and several liability satisfies both criteria, as settled parties are immune
from future contribution claims, and other parties' settlements do not increase
or decrease nonsettlors' expected liabilities. Much like proportionate share
apportionment, limited joint and several liability preserves settlement incen-
tives, but does not provide additional incentives at the expense of other,
nonsettling defendants.
The Court's final consideration was judicial economy; although an
important factor, the Court felt it could not come at "too high a price in unfair-
ness."'48 The Court preliminarily found that pro tanto apportionment with
contribution was "clearly inferior" to other apportionment modes because it
burdened the courts with ancillary contribution litigation. 49 A pro tanto rule
that did not allow contribution would maximize judicial economy;" 0 however,
this approach had such a "large potential for unfairness" that the Court would
not consider it.'' Between pro tanto with "good faith" settlement hearings and
proportionate share apportionment, the Court found the differences in judicial
economy slight.S2 However, the proportionate share approach maximized
judicial economy by delaying the determination of a settled party's liability
until trial, where it would take "little or no additional trial time" or, for that
matter, the case might have already settled." 3
Limited joint and several liability similarly serves the interests ofjudicial
economy. Reallocating a judgment-proof party's share of damages among the
other parties is straightforward, and the division of those damages among the
other parties will take little or no additional trial time. Because partial settle-
ment does not change the liabilities of nonsettling parties, courts do not need
to conduct the "good faith" settlement hearings that the McDermott Court
147. See id. at 211 n.13 (explaining that settlors "ordinarily" have no right of contribution).
148. Id. at 215. "Congestion in the courts cannot justify a legal rule that produces unjust
results in litigation simply to encourage speedy out-of-court accommodations." (citing United
States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397,408 (1975)).
149. Id. at211-12.
150. See id. at 216 (reasoning that pro tanto apportionment without "good faith" hearings
would be easy to administer because a court would never adjudicate the settling defendant's
fault).
151. See id. (stating that the approach would be so unfair that "no party or amicus"
advocates it).
152. See id. ("The effect of the two rules on judicial economy is also ambiguous.").
153. Id. at217.
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disfavored. 54 Contribution litigation is likewise superfluous. 5 Like propor-
tionate share allocation, then, limited joint and several liability can minimize
demands on the courts.
C. Modeling the Bargaining of Uncertainty
The mathematical abstraction developed in Part III, taken further, can
show that the limited joint and several approach best preserves parties' expec-
tations in settlement. Recall that, in a claim against two defendants, the at-trial
payment to the plaintiff (P)-assuming no defendants are judgment-proof-is
D .f. + D "fb. The expected value of this payment prior to trial is E[D] E[fJ
-po. r + E[D]. E[f]- Pb r, reflecting the unknown nature of fault and dam-
ages, the uncertainty of prevailing against either defendant, and the discount
rate. If defendant a is or becomes judgment-proof, then defendant b will pay
D. (f. +fb), or all damages attributed to either defendant. Before trial, defen-
dant b will expect to pay both its proportionate share of damages and a's share
of damages if a is or becomes judgment-proof. The risk that a is or will be-
come judgment-proof varies; the variable u. represents it.' 6 If, as inEdmonds,
a is immune to the plaintiff's suit, then b will certainly pay a's share of dam-
ages, and u, = 1. If a is simply facing potential bankruptcy, then b's liability
for a's share of damages is less than certain, and 0 < u, < 1. Accordingly, after
relaxing the assumption that defendant a can and will pay its share of a judg-
ment, b's expected payment is b's expected share of damages and the risk that
a will be judgment-proof:
E[Pb] = E[D]" E[fb] pb r + u, E[D] E[f,] • p," r
For example, if the risk that a will be judgment-proof is 0.4, then b faces both
its expected share and 40% of a's expected share.
Another hypothetical defendant, c, is necessary to show the allocation of
this risk in settlement. Assuming that only a can become judgment-proof,
defendants b and c collectively bear both their own expected shares of damages
and the risk that a will be judgment-proof (u,. E[D]. E[f.] • po. r). 17 Because
154. See id. (discussing the superiority of at-trial determinations of relative culpability
versus pretrial determinations); see also supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (discussing
McDermott's expressed favor for at-trial liability determinations).
155. Cf McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 209 (1994) (holding that, under
proportionate share approach, contribution suits are both unnecessary and prohibited because
nonsettling defendants "pay no more than their share of the judgment").
156. Though it is impossible (or close to impossible) to cite others for every step in this
subpart's analysis, it is still noteworthy that other authorities have modeled the impact of a
defendant's potential insolvency by multiplying the solvency risk times the expected damages.
Komhauser & Revesz, supra note 111, at 520.
157. Of course this assumption is unrealistic, as any defendant has the potential of being
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b and c will proportionately share the risk of a's inability to pay b er the
limited joint and several system, b will share a's damages in the o 7/fi + fi.
Defendant c will share in a's share of damages in the ratio of f" + ., mean-
ing that b and c together pay a's full share of damages. Defendant b will expect
to share uncollectible damages attributed to a in the ratio:
_ E[fa] " pb 158
sb=E[fi]'pb + E[fi] .pc
Defendant c will expect to pay a similar ratio:
E[fc] .p,
E[fi] .Pb + E[fc] .pc
or becoming judgment-proof. A more accurate approach would view an individual defendant's
expected payment as that defendant's expected share of damages discounted by the possibility
that it (the individual defendant at issue) will be insolvent, plus each other defendant's expected
payments multiplied by the possibility that those defendants will become insolvent. Under this
formulation, b's expected payment is E[Pb] - (1 - ub) E[D]" E[f] "Pb r + E~l] "Pb + (Elfb]
*Pb + E[J] *pJ u.aE[D] "EV p.r+ Ebfa P+(EVfp +E~fl Pb) " uE[D]" EVf]"
Pc ' r. Thus, b expects to pay its expected share of damages discounted by its own risk of
insolvency, as well as proportionate shares of a's and c's damages if those defendants become
judgment-proof. However, even this model is incomplete because it does not fully account for
the risk that both a and c will be judgment-proof, in which case b will pay all damages.
Nevertheless, by assuming that only one defendant is in danger of being judgment-proof, the
simpler model illustrates precisely the same point: parties have rational expectations regarding
other parties' solvency. Moreover, this assumption is not entirely unrealistic: because most
defendants are not judgment-proof, typical cases will not involve more than one defendant that
is realistically in danger of being judgment-proof.
158. One might think that the expected ratio is simply the fraction of the expected faults,
but this ignores the fact that whether or not a factfinder will even find liability is unknown at
trial. Suppose that b and c expect to share fault equally (30% each), but that the chance of
prevailing against c is very low (0.1) while the chance of prevailing against b is good (0.9).
Without considering the probability of success, one would think that b expects to pay half of
a's damages in the event a is judgment-proof. However, before trial b knows that the plaintiff
probably cannot prevail against c, and that if the plaintiff cannot prevail, then b will pay both
its share of damages and a's share of damages (if a is insolvent). Because c probably will not
pay any damages, the plaintiff thus expects to pay 90% of a's damages if a is judgment-proof:
(EVl Pb) + (EV] "Pb + E,]" p) = (0.3 0.9) + (0.3 .0.9 + 0.3" 0.1) = 0.9. For the sake of
simplicity, this Note represents the ratio with the variable s. Note that if Pb = p. then the
expression simplifies back to EEf] + (EEf] + E[f]) because Pb and p, become the same constant
that equally affect the numerator and denominator. Many cases will involve probabilities of
success that are highly correlated, thus negating the need to consider the import of uncorrelated
probabilities of success. See Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement with Multiple Plaintiffs: The Role
oflnsolvency, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 295,296 (2002) (noting that positive correlation can result
from common unresolved questions of law or from the fact that the cases rely upon the same
evidence or facts).
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And finally, note that sb + s, = I and that sb = 1 - s. Because b expects to pay
a's damages in the ratio Sb" u,, b's expected payment becomes:
E[Pb] = E[D]" E[fb] ' r + Sb U E[D]" E[f,] "p. " r
In the event of partial settlement, McDermott stipulates the entry of
proportionate share judgments against the nonsettling defendants. Thus, if
plaintiff and c settle, then the court will enter judgment against b for the full
amount ofthe damages, less those damages attributed to other defendants or to
the plaintiff (recall that P is the sum of all payments by defendants):
Pb =P- offset =P-D .- D .fL=D "fb
Otherwise stated, the judgment against b will be the multiple of the total
damages and b's comparative fault. However, if a is judgment-proof, then
under the limited joint and several approach the court will enter judgment
against b for both its own share of damages and for its proportionate share of
a's damages:
Pb=Dfb+ Dff + .D
If c settles before trial-when damages (D), fault Q9, probability of success (p),
and probability that a will be judgment-proof (u.) are uncertain-then b's
expected at-trial payment is:
E[Pb] = E[D]" E[f]" Pb r + Sb" u," E[D]" E[f,] " p." r
This is, of course, the amount that b expects to pay before c settles. Thus,
under the limited joint and several liability regime, c's settlement does not
affect b's expected liability to the plaintiff.
A good way to illustrate how the limited joint and several approach best
preserves party expectations is to use two hypothetical examples in which a
court does not follow it. In the simplest of terms, a court could choose to enter
judgment against b for either more or less than the amount indicated by the
limited joint and several liability approach. At one extreme, a court could hold
that a settlement between c and the plaintiff makes b only severally liable for
damages. After the plaintiff and c had settled, b's expected payment would
become:
E[Pb] = E[D]" Efl "Pb" r
Accordingly, after c's settlement, b would not expectto pay Sb ' u. E[D] E[f,]
• p." r, and the plaintiff would not expect to recover a's share of damages from
any party if a were to become judgment-proof. The settlement between c and
the plaintiff would thus alter the liability that b faced. This system would
discourage partial settlement because any partial settlement would extinguish
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the plaintiff's ability to collect any of a's share of damages at trial if a were
judgment-proof.
In this situation, the plaintiff's pre-settlement expectation would be full
recovery by operation of joint and several liability:
E[P] = E[D]' (E[.] 'p + E[] "P + E[f] Pb)" r
While all defendants were still parties, the risk that a would be judgment-proof
(u.) would be immaterial to the plaintiff because any shortfall by a would be
paid by b and c. After settlement, however, the plaintiff could not collect any
damages allocated to a in the event that a was judgment-proof. The plaintiff's
expected recovery post-settlement would be:
E[P] = E[D]. E lPb" r + (I - u.) E[D]" E[f.] "p.' r
In other words, the plaintiff would expect to recover both b's share and a's
share, but its recovery of a's share would be discounted by the probability that
a becomes judgment proof. The settlement thus reduces the plaintiff's ex-
pected recovery at trial by the multiple of the risk of a's insolvency and a's
expected share of damages, ua. E[D]. E[fa] .pa. r; the plaintiff bears the risk
of a's insolvency. Unless c were willing to pay both its own share of damages
and an amount representing the entire risk of a's insolvency, no plaintiff would
rationally settle with c because the settlement would place the plaintiff in a
worse position than it previously occupied. Thus, the plaintiff will not settle
with c for less than:
E[D]. E[f] "pc r + u°. E[D]. E[f, " p." r
Defendant c's expected liability at trial is functionally identical to b's:
E[PJ = E[D]" E[c] Pc" r + s, u.'E[D]" Ef.] p." r
It follows that the plaintiff will not accept less than c's expected share and
the risk of a's insolvency, and that c will not pay more than its own expected
share and its expected share of the risk that a will become insolvent. Unless
the risk of insolvency is insignificant (uo - 0), or unless c's expected share of
a's damages is great (s, - 1), the parties' own interests will likely keep them
from reaching a settlement. Moreover, any settlement they do reach will
materially alter the expectations of the nonsettlors.
At the other extreme, a court could hold that a settlement between the
plaintiff and c in no way limited the joint liability between a and b. Inthe event
that a were judgment-proof, b would pay the full amount of damages allocated
to a. Defendant b's expected payment after c's partial settlement would be:
E[Pb] = E[D]" E[fb] Pb r + u." E[D]" E[f] "p. r
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Thus, after c's settlement, b's expected payment on account of a would in-
crease from Sb" u." E[D]" E[f,] • p," r to u. E[D]" E[f,] p. -r. The increase
to b's expected payment is:
(1 -Sb)* u," E[D]" E[f,] "p. r=s, "u° • E[D]" E[f,] -p' r
Of course, this amount is the share of a's obligation that c expects to pay prior
to its settlement. Effectively, c's settlement transfers c's share of the joint
obligation to b.
At this extreme, the plaintiff still expects to recover b's share of damages
and all of a's share of damages after it settles with c. The plaintiff will ratio-
nally settle with c for an amount equal to or greater than c's own individual
share of the damages (E[D]. E[f] "p" r). By so settling, c and the plaintiff
simply transfer c's share of the joint liability for a's potential insolvency (s,•
u," E[D]. E[f,] •p." r) to b. Clearly, then, a rule of unlimited joint and several
liability encourages c to settle by allowing it to settle for less than its expected
payment, but does so at the expense of an increase in b's expected payment.
This analysis demonstrates that deviating from the limited joint and
several approach allows partial settlements to change other parties' expecta-
tions. Because the proportionate share rule's justification is that it preserves
parties' expectations, failing to attribute portions of judgment-proof defen-
dants' damages to prior settlements is at odds with the allocative mechanism's
use. The considerations that compel the use of the proportionate share ap-
proach duly compel the use of the limited joint and several liability approach.
V Do Lower Court Decisions Support the Limited Joint
and Several Approach?
A. Federal Decisions
At least one decision that pre-dates McDermott from the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit supports the proportionate reallocation of
judgment-proof defendants' shares of damages. In Bertram v. Freeport
McMoran, Inc. ," an injured oil barge worker (Bertram) sued four defendants,
including his employer. 60 Before trial, Bertram settled with all four, but
contribution claims among the parties remained."" Notably, Bertram's
employer, Energy Catering Services, Inc., sought recovery from Freeport-
McMoran, Inc. and Houma Industries, Inc. for maintenance and cure benefits
159. Bertram v. Freeport McMoran, Inc., 35 F.3d 1008 (5th Cir. 1994).
160. Id. at 1011.
161. Id. Recall that a shipowner must pay maintenance and cure benefits to an injured
seaman regardless of fault. Supra note 131.
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it (Energy) had paid to Bertram. 62 A bench trial allocated liability 60% to
Bertram and 20% each to Freeport and Houma. 63 Because Freeport and
Houma had partially caused Bertram's injury, and because Energy was
faultless, Energy could recover the entirety of its maintenance and cure
payments from the two codefendants, notwithstanding Bertram's own negli-
gence. " Thus, the issue before the Bertram court was the correct reallocation
of damages among two codefendants, each only 20% responsible for the
plaintiff's harm.
The Fifth Circuit discussed the rationales of comparative fault. 6" When
a shipowner is negligent, that shipowner can recover only individual defen-
dants' proportionate shares of the maintenance and cure benefits that the
shipowner has paid.'" However, when a shipowner is negligence-free,
tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable to the shipowner for the amount of
its maintenance and cure payments. 67 After this discussion, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's equal division of the maintenance and cure
benefits between Houma and Freeport."6
Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit did not precisely articulate its allocation
methodology. Given the court's discussion of comparative fault principles,
one could reasonably conclude that the court reallocated fault on a compara-
tive basis: each defendant was 20% responsible, so relative to each other they
were equally at-fault and split damages likewise. This interpretation accords
with the doctrine of proportionate fault, which the Court described in Reliable
Transfer as the doctrine that liability "be allocated among the parties propor-
tionately to the comparative degree of their fault."'69 In other words, even
though certain defendants are jointly and severally liable for an amount that
exceeds their individual shares of damages, those defendants still share this
joint obligation on a proportionate basis.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's decision in In re Exxon
Valdez -7°litigation arising from the infamous oil spill that occurred when
162. Bertram, 35 F.3d at 1011.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1013,1021.
165. Id. at 1019-21.
166. See id. at 1020 (stating that a tortfeasor contributes to a concurrently negligent
employer "to the extent" the accident was occasioned by the tortfeasor's fault (quoting Adams
v. Texaco, Inc., 640 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982))).
167. See id. (stating that a fault-free shipowner can collect all maintenance and cure
benefits from the negligent parties).
168. Id. at 1021.
169. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975).
170. In re Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2000).
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the oil tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in Prince William Sound, Alaska,
releasing I 1 million gallons of oil 71-also supports the proportionate imputa-
tion of joint obligations to settled parties. In the Valdez litigation, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Alaska consolidated hundreds of punitive
damage claims against the Exxon Corporation into a mandatory class action. 7'
Exxon's settlements with individual plaintiffs eliminated those plaintiffs from
the allocation of the punitive damages award, but did not reduce the amount
of the award itself 173 Thus, Exxon was to remain liable for the full amount
of punitive damages taxed against it, notwithstanding its prior settlement of
many of the individual suits giving rise to the damages. To overcome this
"disincentive" to settlement, Exxon settled with several plaintiffs using a
"cede back" arrangement under which the plaintiffs remained parties to the
suit, but agreed to return their shares of the future punitive damages award to
Exxon.1 74 After a jury returned a $5 billion punitive damages award-"the
largest award of its kind in history"' -the nonsettling plaintiffs argued that
the court should not allocate damages to plaintiffs who had agreed to return
their shares of the punitive damages to Exxon.
76
Although the issue before the Ninth Circuit concerned multiple plaintiffs'
claims against a single defendant, the court analogized to the McDermott
scenario in which a single plaintiff presents claims against multiple defen-
dants.'" The court reasoned that the "potential distortion of settlement
incentives" was "the same"'78 and that Exxon's settlement using the "cede
back" arrangement was "the functional equivalent of a proportionate share
allocation of damages.' ' 79 The court went on to hold that the settlement
agreement was enforceable and that the court should not have informed the
jury of its existence.'
171. Id. at 793.
172. Id.
173. See id. ("[A] plaintiff's release of its slice of the future lump-sum punitive damages
award merely reduced the number of claimants sharing the punitive damages pie, not the size
of the pie itself.").
174. Id.
175. Id. at 794.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 796 ("We deal here with multiple plaintiffs suing one defendant, but an
analogous problem frequently occurs in the more typical situation of a single plaintiff with
claims against multiple defendants.").
178. Id. at 797.
179. Id. at 798.
180. See id. ("[W]e cannot hold such an agreement unenforceable as a matter of public
policy."); id. at 799 ("lt is clear that cede back agreements should generally not be revealed
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Exxon's obligation to pay punitive damages to a class of plaintiffs is, of
course, very similar to jointly liable defendants' obligation to pay a plaintiff
the damages assessed against a judgment-proof codefendant. In both in-
stances, parties must transfer a sum to other parties, and that sum is either a
collective obligation or a collective benefit. In both instances, a legal system
that seeks to facilitate dispute resolution must ensure that partial settlements
do not change the incentives faced by nonsettling parties. Just as two parties
can agree to eliminate all liability between them without disturbing other
parties' claims, so too can parties agree to eliminate liability for other forms
of collective damages-whether those damages are a defendant's anticipated
share of damages reallocated from a judgment-proof defendant, or a plaintiff's
anticipated share of punitive damages allocated to it from a lump sum amount.
Thus, In re Erxon Valdez supports the proposition that proportionate share
settlements can reach danages that lie beyond the fault-based damages
allocated between settled parties.
B. State Decisions
Two decisions from Louisiana's Circuit Courts of Appeal appear to
interpret McDermott to require only nonsettling defendants to share in an
absent codefendant's share of damages. The precise facts of the first case,
Mayo v. Nissan Motor Corp. ," are important to understanding the decision's
import. The opinion came down but two months after the Supreme Court
decided McDermott. 82 A bench trial had apportioned liability 11% to each
of three defendants and 67% to the plaintiff's husband, who was operating the
boat in which the plaintiff was a passenger at the time of the accident giving
rise to her tort.'83 The plaintiff had not named her husband as a defendant;
instead, the other defendants had impleaded the husband as a third-party
defendant.'84 One defendant settled, and the trial court applied a pro rata
comparative fault approach to its apportionment of damages.'85 Thus, the trial
to jures deliberating on punitive damages.").
181. See Mayo v. Nissan Motor Corp., 639 So. 2d 773,789 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (conclud-
ing, partially on the basis of McDermott's "equitable share" holding, that "plaintiff is entitled
to recover up to 100% of her damages from either Nissan or Red River, less the amount of the
equitable share (proportion of fault) of the obligation of Fisher Marine, the settling tortfeasor").
182. Compare id. at 773 (decision of June 22, 1994) with McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde,
511 U.S.'202 (1994) (decision ofApr. 20, 1994).
183. Mayo, 639 So. 2d at 776.
184. Id. at 790.
185. See id. at 782 ("This Court can find no prohibition from extending comparative fault
to admiralty cases in state courts." (quoting trial court)).
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court held each of the two nonsettling defendant's liable for only their individ-
ual 11% shares of the plaintiff's damages."8 6 The trial court accordingly
dismissed the defendants' contribution claims against the plaintiff's
husband. 8 7
The framing of the issues at the trial and appellate levels is somewhat
informative. The trial court had considered the issue one of proportionate
fault. Incorrectly concluding that Louisiana law (as opposed to federal
maritime law) applied to the suit,"88 the trial court had held each defendant
liable "for only [its] joint, divisible obligation."'8 9 On appeal, the state's Third
Circuit Court of Appeals considered the issue one of joint and several liabil-
ity, noting that joint and several liability principles under state law conflict
with those of the maritime law.'" Under maritime law, a plaintiff can recover
its 'full damages" from any joint tortfeasor.'
From this framework, the court next considered apportionment. The
court read McDermott's adoption of the proportionate share rule (against the
backdrop of the Fifth Circuit's prior use of pro tanto apportionment)" to
require that the two nonsettling defendants bear "100% of [the plaintiff's]
damages" less the "equitable share (proportion of fault)" of the settling
defendant. 193 Thus, the court held the two 11% defendants liable for 89% of
the plaintiff's award. 94
The Mayo court additionally considered a related issue: the nonsettling
defendants' contribution claims against the plaintiff's husband. 95 The court
declined to decide whether the nonsettling defendants' claims (dismissed by
the trial court) could proceed because the parties had not raised the issue on
appeal.' Partially because of this, the decision's real import is unclear. The
186. Id. (quoting trial court).
187. Id. at 790 (quoting trial court).
188. See id. at 782 (stating that comparative fault "is the law of the State of Louisiana and
petitioners shall be bound by it" (quoting trial court)).
189. Id. (quoting trial court).
190. See id. at 789 ("It is clear that there is a conflict between maritime and state law
regarding the extent of exposure for joint tortfeasors.").
191. Id. at 788.
192. See id. at 789 (stating that in McDermott, "the United States Supreme Court reversed
the Fifth Circuit's long-standing rule that a nonsettling tortfeasor is entitled to full credit in the
amount the plaintiff received from a settling tortfeasor").
193. Id.
194. See id. at 791 (imposing joint judgment for full damages less 11% attributed to settled
tortfeasor).
195. Id. at 790-91.
196. See id. at 791 ("The judgment dismissing the third-party demands against Everette
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effect of the decision was that the two 11% defendants were jointly liable for
89% of the plaintiffs damages. However, the court did not necessarily intend
this result: the court confined itself to simply imposing joint and several
liability pursuant to maritime law, and in crediting the settled defendant's
"share" of damages. The court did not consider the treatment of uncollectible
shares of damages as a whole, or even whether the husband's share of dam-
ages was in fact "uncollectible." If the defendants could pursue contribution
from the husband, then (collectibility issues aside) the decision did not even
reach the issue of partial settlements and judgment-proof defendants, as future
contribution actions would ensure that each party paid only its proportionate
share of damages. On the other hand, if the defendants could not pursue
contribution against the husband, then the decision is silent even as to the
allocation among the two nonsettling defendants themselves. (For example,
if the plaintiff collected the full 89% from one defendant, could that defendant
recover only 11% from the other defendant? Or 44.5%? Or 29.7%?). Thus,
although the Mayo decision does suggest an allocation that is at odds with
limited joint and several liability, whether the opinion does anything more
than "suggest" that allocation is unclear.
Louisiana's Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals construed Mayo in
Hennegan v. Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co."9 Unfortunately, the actual
holding and import of this decision is likewise unclear. Hennegan sued his
former employer and a number of asbestos manufacturers for damages arising
from mesothelioma."' Before trial, Hennegan settled with Cooper/T. Smith
and two of the manufacturers.'" A number of defendants were dismissed as
parties: the City of New Orleans (a former employer of Hennegan), an
additional manufacturer, and other unnamed defendants.2" Bankruptcy
proceedings stayed litigation against one final defendant.2"' Ultimately, the
trial court considered the liability of Garlock, Inc., the manufacturer of
asbestos gaskets and packings used in Hennegan's work maintaining steam
Mayo is final. Nissan and Red River Marine did not appeal from this judgment and we are
powerless to revive it.").
197. Hennegan v. Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co., 837 So. 2d 96 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
198. See id. at 100-01 (detailing plaintiff's original claim against employer Cooper/T.
Smith and this party's third-party claims, ultimately included in plaintiff's petition, against
various asbestos manufacturers and an additional former employer of the plaintiff).
199. Id. at 100, 101.
200. See id. at 101 (detailing dismissals of claims against City of New Orleans, Eagle, Inc.,
and "[o]ther defendants.. . dismissed without prejudice before trial" and presumably not listed
in the court's opinion).
201. Id.
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derricks on barrages, 2' Cooper/T. Smith, and the two settled manufacturers. 20 3
The court apportioned 80% fault to Garlock, 20% to Cooper/T. Smith, and
found the two settled defendants faultless. 204 (The court apparently did not
consider the fault of the bankrupt defendant.205) Citing "maritime joint and
several liability,"2 the trial court entered judgment against Garlock for 80%
of the $3,096,769.62 award.207
Facially, this result seems to square with proportionate share allocation:
Garlock was 80% liable and paid 80% of the damages. However, the trial
court's decision suggests that a nonsettling defendant is liable for all damages,
less the share of damages apportioned to settled defendants, even when
codefendants are judgment-proof.' As noted, the court apparently did not
consider the fault of bankrupt defendant Owens Coming Fiberglass. The trial
court reasoned that Garlock bore 80% responsibility because, under maritime
joint and several liability, a joint defendant "is liable unto plaintiff for the
whole of plaintiffs injuries."2" The court relied on Mayo to support the
proposition that a maritime court should limit its allocation of fault to defen-
dants named as parties.10 The court then built from this to conclude that "the
risk of the inability to collect from joint tortfeasors rests with the defen-
dant"211-a proposition contextually suggesting that only nonsettling defen-
dants should bear the risk of insolvency.
In support of its final proposition, the court cited Coats v. Penrod Drill-
ing Corp., 2 the case in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
declined to apportion an immune defendant's share of damages between a
defendant and a plaintiff.2 3  This case's support for allocating only to
202. Id. at 100.
203. Id. at 101.
204. Id.
205. See id. (detailing trial court's liability determination and not mentioning role of
defendant Owens Coming Fiberglass).
206. Id. at II1 (quoting trial court's Reasons for Judgment).
207. See id. at 101 (amount also increased by unspecified amount of prejudgment interest).
208. See id. at 111 ("Under a claim of solidary liability, the risk of non-collectability of the
judgment against the party not named by the plaintiff rests with the solidary obligors").
209. Id. (quoting trial court's Reasons for Judgment).
210. See Hennegan v. Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co., 837 So. 2d 96, 111 (La. Ct. App.
2003) (stating that in Mayo a state appellate court "held that limiting the plaintiffs' recovery to
percentages of fault attributable to the named defendants was inconsistent with maritime
solidary liability").
211. Id
212. Id. (citing Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 61 F.3d 1113 (5th Cir. 1995)).
213. See Coats, 61 F.3d at 1122 (detailing appellant's claim for modification of trial
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nonsettling defendants is dubious; Coats merely stands for the proposition that
the burden of an immune defendant's share of damages lies only with defen-
dants, not the plaintiff 14 and does not consider how the risk of a judgment-
proof defendant should be spread among those defendants. Additionally,
although the Mayo court had indeed addressed partial settlement and an absent
party, the opinion confined itself to reversing the trial court's imposition of
the husband's share of fault to his plaintiff wife, without considering the
liability of the husband." 5
The Hennegan court concluded its discussion of joint and several liabil-
ity with a discussion of McDermott's footnote ten: According to Hennigan,
the McDermott Court "noted" that "the non-settling defendant's share of the
judgment includes any fault attributable to immune or absent parties."2 1 6 The
court did not mention that the McDermott Court qualified its footnote discus-
sion to clarify that it was not dispositively addressing the issue of allocating
uncollectible damages among defendants, 217 nor did it discuss the other
portions of McDermott that suggest a different joint and several liability
approach where both settlement and immunity restrict a plaintiff's ability to
recover. 21 1 Moreover, the rationale underlying Hennegan's assertion that a
court should only allocate fault to at-trial defendants does not stand up well
on close analysis. The court noted the plaintiff's argument that failing to
allocate fault to "missing tortfeasors" would discourage settlement because
settlement would causethe plaintiffto lose the abilityto collect damages fromthe
court's judgment "by limiting [plaintifis] ability to recover the entire judgment from either
[appellant or the immune codefendant] in proportion to [plaintiff's] own contributory negli-
gence"); id. at 1139 (affirming trial court).
214. See id. at 1123 (detailing appellant's rejected allocation rule, which would make "a
partially-negligent plaintiff... bear part of the risk of noncollection, rather than placing the
entire burden upon the defendants").
215. See Mayo v. Nissan Motor Corp., 639 So. 2d 773, 786 (La. Ct. App. 1994) ("[W~e
hold that imputation of Reverand Mayo's negligence to Mrs. May on the basis of the marital
relation would be improper.").
216. Hennegan, 837 So. 3d at I II(citing McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202,210
n. 10 (1994)).
217. See McDermott, 511 U.S. at 210 n. 10 (stating that the result "could be seen as
mandated by principles of joint and several liability" but that "[n]evertheless, McDermott has
not requested that River Don pay more than its 38% share of the damages"). The Court
ultimately resolved the matter by stating that the "best way" of viewing AmClyde's damage
waiver was "as a quasi settlement in advance of any tort claims." Id.
218. See id. at 221 ("Unlike the rule in Edmonds, the proportionate share rule announced
in this opinion applies when there has been a settlement. In such cases, the plaintiffs recovery
against the settling defendant has been limited not by outside forces, but by its own agreement
to settle. There is no reason to allocate any shortfall to the other defendants, who were not
parties to the settlement.").
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missing parties, but it did not elaborate upon the point.219 Had it done so, it
might have noted that the McDermott Court found pro tanto allocation's
promotion of settlement (by allowing early-settling defendants to settle with
low amounts) outweighed by its "high price in unfairness." Under such a rule,
the Court concluded that settlement would unfairly "threaten the nonsettling
defendant with the prospect of paying more than its fair share of the loss.""2
In any event, there may be some comfort in the knowledge that Hennegan's
assertion that "the non-settling defendant's share of the judgment includes any
fault attributable to immune or absent parties""2 is questionable as precedent.
Because the trial court found Garlock 80% liable and assessed 80% of the
judgment against Garlock, the issue of Garlock's liability for a judgment-
proof defendant's shares of damages was beyond the issues necessary for the
court to reach its opinion,222 and the pronouncement arguably has the status
of dicta. Nonetheless, both decisions are disturbing in that they analyze the
apportionment of partial settlements through the lens of joint and several
liability, without considering what damages lie within a jointly liable tortfea-
sor's settlement. By making the issue the relatively simple one of, "does joint
and several liability make other defendants liable for judgment-proof defen-
dants' shares of damages?," both courts essentially decide the issue before
they consider it. A better framing might be, "given that defendants are jointly
liable for a judgment-proof codefendant's share, but that settlements encom-
219. Hennegan v. Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co., 837 So. 2d 96, 111 (La. Ct. App.
2003).
220. McDermott, 511 U.S. at 215.
221. Hennegan, 837 So. 2d at 111.
222. Garlock challenged the court's failure to include defendants that were absent from the
litigation. See id. at 110-11 (detailing Oarlock's claim that "the trial court erred in finding
Garlock liable for all of Mr. Hennegan's damages and by failing to apportion an appropriate
share to the remaining defendants" and noting that maritime law considers fault of all defen-
dants "regardless of whether they settled before trial"). Though Garlock also argued that the
trial court should have found both that the two settling defendants were liable and that Coo-
per/T. Smith was more than 20% liable, see id. at 111-12 (detailing claims on appeal concern-
ing fault determinations), the appellate court did not find error in the trial court's liability
allocations, id. Thus, the only claim adjudicated by the court's holding concerned the "remain-
ing" defendants, id. at 110, non-parties and the bankrupt Owens Coming not at all considered
by the trial court. "When an opinion issues for the Court, it is not only the result but also those
portions of the opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound." Seminole Tribe of Fla.
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996); see also Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 128 (La.
2000) ("Under the civilian tradition, while a single decision is not binding on our courts, when
a series of decisions form a 'constant stream of uniform and homogenous rulings having the
same reasoning,' jurisprudence constante applies and operates with 'considerable persuasive
authority.'" (quoting James L. Dennis, Interpretation andApplication of the Civil Code and the
Evaluation ofJudicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1993))).
60 WASH. & LEE L. REV 623 (2003)
pass all damages taxed to a defendant at trial, should the court's reallocation
depend upon whether any individual defendant has settled?"
The reallocation of judgment-proof defendants' shares of damages finds
better support in state tort law.' For example, in Paradise Valley Hospital
v. Schlossman," a California appellate court considered the correct treatment
of an insolvent defendant's share of damages. 5 California had both adopted
comparative fault and retained joint and several liability.226 The court rea-
soned that the "next logical extension" of these principles was to allocate an
insolvent defendant's share of damages among solvent defendants proportion-
ately.227 Because the legal system assesses liability on the basis of fault, not
dividing an insolvent's share proportionately would "create a philosophically
and legally unacceptable burr. " 22' As the court had stated earlier in its deci-
sion, the non-proportionate division of an insolvent's share of damages "is not
compatible with the comparative negligence goal of apportioning damages
223. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(g) (West Supp. 2001) (providing that
an insolvent's share of damages be allocated proportionately among all the other defendants);
Gauthier v. O'Brien, 618 So. 2d 824, 832 (La. 1993) (holding that the damages attributed to an
immune employer should be reallocated to other defendants on a relative fault basis), overruled
by Cavalier v. Cain's Hydrostatic Testing, Inc., 657 So. 2d 975, 983 (La. 1995) (holding that
state's apportionment statute does not require the inclusion of an employer in the factfinder's
liability allocation).
224. Paradise Valley Hosp. v. Schlossman, 191 Cal. Rptr. 531 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). In
Paradise Valley Hospital, California's Fourth District Court of Appeals considered the
apportionment of an insolvent defendant's share of damages among the remaining, solvent
defendants. Id. at 532. Plaintiffs sued a hospital and two doctors in negligence and recovered
a verdict for $1.5 million. Id. at 533. One doctor, 50% responsible for the plaintiffs' injury,
filed for bankruptcy. Id. The hospital, 10% responsible, paid $500,000, and the other doctor,
40% responsible, paid $1 million to satisfy the judgment. Id. The hospital and the solvent
doctor cross-complained for contribution for the amounts that each had paid in excess of its
proportionate share of damages. Id. The court reasoned that California's adoption of compara-
tive negligence did not "compel the demise" of joint and several liability. Id. Rejecting the
position that the insolvent doctor's share of damages should be divided equally between the two
solvent defendants, the court ruled that the "next logical extension" of comparative fault
required the division of the insolvent doctor's share of damages between the solvent defendants
proportionate to those defendants' comparative faults. Id. at 536. The hospital, 10% responsi-
ble, should pay $300,000 in damages (it's $150,000 share of the $1.5 million judgment and
20% of the insolvent's $750,000 share), and the solvent doctor, 40% responsible should pay
$1.2 million in damages (his $600,000 share of the $1.5 million judgment and 80% of the
insolvent's $750,000 share). Id.
225. Id. at 532.
226. Id. at 536.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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according to [tortfeasor's] degree of fault."2 29 Indeed, at least one scholar
discussing California's adoption of comparative fault reasons that comparative
fault principles, coupled with joint and several liability, indicate that "all
solvent parties whose culpable conduct is causally implicated in an injury
should bear the burden of an insolvent defendant according to their relative
proportionate fault.
2 30
C. Comparing the Pierringer Release
Many courts' treatment of settlements made with "Pierringer releases"
supports the limited joint and several liability approach to apportioning
judgment-proof defendants. Pierringer releases derive their name from
Pierringer v. Hoger,23' a 1963 Wisconsin Supreme Court decision construing
the effect of a release that discharged a defendant's proportionate share of
liability. 2  A Pierringer release encompasses all damages "caused by the
negligence" of a settling defendant, and the settling plaintiff agrees to release
and discharge the defendant for "the sum of the portions or fractions or
percentages of causal negligence for which [the defendant] hereto [is] found
to be liable."2 33  Because the plaintiff releases the portion of the cause of
action attributed to the settling defendant, a nonsettling defendant pays only
its proportionate share of the plaintiff's damages.23 4 Thus, nonsettling
229. Id. at 535 (citing VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 16.7, at 261
(I st ed. 1974)).
230. Harry N. Zavos, Comparative Fault and the Insolvent Defendant: A Critique and
Amplification of American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 14 LOY. LA. L. REV.
775,817 (1981).
231. Pierringer v. Hoger, 124 N.W.2d 106 (Wis. 1963). In Pierringer, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court reviewed contribution claims asserted by nonsettling parties against defendants
that settled with releases discharging the portion of the plaintiff's damages caused by the settling
parties' negligence. Id. at 108. The plaintiffs had been injured in an explosion allegedly caused
by multiple defendants. Id. at 107. All defendants, except one, settled before trial using such
releases and sought dismissal of the contribution claims asserted against them. Id. The court
ruled that settlement for a defendant's share of liability barred contribution claims asserted
against that defendant. See id. at 112 (ruling that trial court's grant of summary judgment was
not erroneous). The release agreements provided that the plaintiff would satisfy any portion of
a judgment against a nonsettling party that was in excess of that party's proportionate share of
damages, so the court ruled that a trial court should give the release "immediate effect" and enter
judgment only for the nonsettlor's proportionate share of damages. Id.
232. See id. at 111 (rejecting nonsettling codefendant's argument that prior case law
allowed its contribution action to proceed against settled codefendants).
233. Id. at 108 (quoting language of release).
234. See id. (construing release language and noting the superfluity of provisions providing
for the indemnification of a settling defendant).
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codefendants cannot seek contribution from settling parties.23 Finally,
because a settled defendant's share of liability materially affects the liability
of nonsettling defendants, the trier of fact must determine that settled party's
relative culpability."6 In practical effect, Pierringer settlements are very
similar to proportionate share apportionment: under both arrangements,
settlements represent a settling defendant's (yet-to-be-determined) share of
liability, nonsettling defendants pay no more than their equitable shares of
damages, settling defendants are not subject to future contribution claims, and
triers of fact must determine settled parties' relative culpabilities. 7
States are divided on the effect of Piernnger releases on judgment-proof
defendants' shares of damages.23 Minnesota's construction, expressed in
Frederickson v. Alton M Johnson Co., 2 9 supports the limited joint and several
liability approach. In Frederickson, the plaintiff sought recovery from three
joint tortfeasors. Trial by jury resulted in findings of 40% fault to each of two
defendants, 12% fault to another defendant, and 8% comparative fault to the
plaintiff.24° The plaintiff settled with one of the 40% defendants using a
Pierringer release, and the other 40% defendant's share of damages proved
uncollectible.241 Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered the realloca-
tion of a joint codefendant's share of damages among settled and nonsettled
parties.
242
First, the court limited the impact of the settlement on joint and several
liability: the plaintiff's settlement with one defendant under a Pierringer
235. See id. at 111 (holding that the trier of fact must determine the settling parties'
liabilities because contribution actions are barred).
236. See id. at 112 (holding that the failure to include a settled party in liability apportion-
ment was prejudicial error).
237. See In re Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d 790,797 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Pierringer releases have
the effect of reaching a proportionate share result . . "); Peter B. Knapp, Keeping the
Pierringer Promise: Fair Settlements and Fair Trials, 20 WM. MrrcHEIL L. REV. 1, 3 (1994)
(reviewing key components of Pierringer releases); see also Daniel Levi, Note, A Comparison
of Comparative Negligence Statutes: Jury Allocation of Fault-Do Defendants Risk Paying
for the Fault ofNonparty Torffeasors?, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 407, 418-20 (1998) (reviewing the
characteristics of Pierringer releases and noting the impropriety of using pro tanto credits with
them).
238. See Knapp, supra note 237, at 26 (noting that courts are split regarding the allocation
of insolvent and immune parties' shares under Pierringer releases).
239. Frederickson v. Alton M. Johnson Co., 402 N.W.2d 794,798 (Minn. 1987).
240. Id. at 796.
241. Id.
242. See id. (stating that the two issues considered are the appropriateness of verdict
reduction and the reallocation of uncollectible portions of the judgment).
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release does not "waive joint liability between all defendants.' 243 Thus, the
court held the remaining (nonsettling) parties jointly and severally liable for
the uncollectible 40% share.244 However, Minnesota's comparative negli-
gence statute provided for the reallocation of an uncollectible judgment
among "the other parties" according to those parties' percentages of fault.
2 45
Thus, the court reallocated the 40% uncollectible share such that the
nonsettling (12%) defendant paid 20% of the verdict, the plaintiff (8%) paid
13 1/3% of the verdict, and the settled (40%) defendant's settlement covered
66 2/3% of the verdict.246 Equally significant, the court held that the prior
settlement between the plaintiff and the 40% defendant extinguished the
plaintiffs ability to collect any damages from that defendant. The plaintiff's
release of the 40% liable defendant "to the extent [that it] was liable" released
both the defendant's 40% share of liability and the 26 2/3% share of damages
reallocated to the defendant.
247
The only difference between the outcome in Fredenckson and the
outcome under the limited joint and several liability regime is the allocation
of uncollectible shares to the plaintiff. However, when one considers back-
ground differences between Minnesota law and the maritime law, the two
approaches are even more harmonious. Minnesota law expressly requires
reallocation of uncollectible damages among all parties, "including a claimant
at fault."'2  Alternatively, the maritime law provides that the risk of
uncollectibility is borne by defendants rather than plaintiffs.249 Thus, the
decision supports much of the reasoning of limited joint and several liability,
though applied with different game rules. Specifically, it supports the propo-
sition that courts should attribute all damages that would be taxed against a
party at trial to that party's earlier proportionate share settlement. °
243. Id. at 797 (quoting Hosley v. Armstrong Cork Co., 383 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Minn.
1986)).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 797-98 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 604.02 (1984)).
246. Id. at 798.
247. See id. (ruling that a plaintiff may recover only from the nonsettling defendant
because a release "to the extent of' another solvent defendant's liability encompasses the
uncollectible damages reallocated to the settling defendant).
248. Id. at 797-98 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 604.02 (1984)).
249. See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 221 (1994) (holding that joint and
several liability can result in one defendant paying more than its equitable share of damages
when a plaintiff's recovery is limited by factors outside the plaintiff's control); supra notes
42-43 and accompanying text (discussing Edmonds's resolution of joint and several liability
among defendants).
250. See Frederickson v. Alton M. Johnson Co., 402 N.W.2d 794, 798 (Minn. 1987)
(ruling that a Pierringer settlement includes a settled defendant's liability share after increase
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In a case that is highly illustrative of the reasoning underlying limited
joint and several liability, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held
that Maine law required joint tortfeasors to allocate joint obligations propor-
tionately among themselves. In Austin v. Raymark Industries, Inc.,251 the
plaintiff settled with several defendants using Pierringer releases.252 Trial by
jury resulted in an assessment of 60% fault to a company in Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceedings. 3 Because the court found that Maine law had an
expressed interest in according full compensation to plaintiffs by way of joint
and several liability, it reallocated the bankrupt defendant's share among the
remaining jointly and severally liable defendants.' Maine law also strongly
advocated the allocation of damages on the basis of comparative responsibil-
ity, and the First Circuit accordingly found that the 60% obligation for the
bankrupt defendant's share of damages should be proportionately reallocated
among the remaining defendants.255 Thus, for example, the court reallocated
22.5% (9/40) of the total damages to a defendant assessed 9% responsibil-
ity.256 The court then took its reasoning a step further, holding that the prior
settlements encompassed the settling parties' full liabilities imposed at trial."
The verdict amount should be reduced by the total proportionate liability of
the settling parties, including the damages that would have been reallocated
from the reallocation of an uncollectible portion of damages).
251. Austin v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 841 F.2d 1184 (1st Cir. 1988). In Austin, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered the effect of settlement with Pierringer
releases on the reallocation of an insolvent defendant's share of damages. Id. at 1187. The
plaintiff, the widow of an asbestos worker who died from lung cancer, sought recovery from
sixteen asbestos suppliers. Id. at 1185. Prior to trial, she settled with eight defendants using
Pierringer releases. Id. at 1188. One defendant, Unarco, did not settle before trial. Id. at 1185.
Unarco was in bankruptcy proceedings and was found 60% responsible for injury to the
plaintiff's husband. Id. at 1195. The court ruled that Unarco's share of damages should be
reallocated to the other defendants proportionate to those defendants' comparative fault. Id. at
1196. Because the plaintiff had agreed to "stand in the shoes" of the defendants settling with
Pierringer releases, the verdict was reduced by the portion of Unarco's damages reallocated to
them. Id.
252. Id. at 1188.
253. Id. at 1185.
254. See id. at 1195-96 (reviewing the trial court's allocation of an insolvent defendant's
share of damages and noting that a "powerful principle[]" of Maine law is the full compensation
of plaintiffs by means ofjoint and several liability).
255. See id. at 1196 (holding that reallocation relative to proportionate fault accords with
goals of full compensation and comparative negligence).
256. Id. at 1195.
257. See id. at 1196 (reasoning that the plaintiff agreed to "stand in the shoes" of settling
parties and, therefore, she must "be held responsible" for the uncollectible damage shares
attributed to them).
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to them at trial.' Such a reallocation "seemed to deprive the plaintiff of a
part of her award," but, in fact, reflected only a reduction of the verdict by the
settled defendants' total proportionate share of liability.259
In contrast, both North Dakota and Wisconsin allocate insolvent defen-
dants' shares of damages to nonsettling defendants only.2"c The reasoning
underlying North Dakota's refusal to impute judgment-proof defendants'
shares to settled parties is that plaintiffs would not expect to have their recov-
eries diminished by any more than the proportionate share of fault attributed
to a settled defendant.261 When parties use Piernnger releases, North Dakota
statutory law requires the reduction of a plaintiffs verdict only by the propor-
tionate amount of fault attributed to the settling defendant. 262  This fact,
coupled with the absence of a device for reallocating fault, led the North
Dakota Supreme Court to conclude that a scheme reducing verdicts because
of parties' insolvency or immunity would not fall within the expectations of
plaintiffs.
263
In Wisconsin, Piernnger releases do not require imputation of
insolvents' shares of damages to settled tortfeasors because "[tihere exists no
rule requiring solvent, nonsettling tortfeasors to equitably share that part of a
judgment which is uncollectible from an insolvent, nonsettling tortfeasor.,
264
Because a plaintiff has the right to recover his total damages from any jointly
liable tortfeasor, and because tortfeasors can only seek contribution for others'
proportionate shares of negligence, a defendant forced to pay an insolvent's
share of damages has no right to demand contribution for that amount from
258. See id. (holding that, for example, the verdict should be reduced by a settled defen-
dant's 22% share of proportionate liability and an additional 9% share attributed to the settled
defendant because of a codefendant's insolvency).
259. See id. (reasoning that the reduction of the award did not deprive the plaintiff because
she had assumed all obligations of the settled parties).
260. See Hoerr v. Northfield Foundry & Mach. Co., 376 N.W.2d 323, 332 (N.D. 1985)
(reasoning that a Pierringer-type release does not require the imputation of insolvent or immune
defendants' shares to a plaintiff's prior settlement because the plaintiff would not "expect [this]
as a natural consequence" of release); Chart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 258 N.W.2d 680,687 (Wis.
1977) (holding that courts may not impute an insolvent defendant's share of damages to settled
defendants because no requirement exists that defendants share in a codefendant's insolvency
proportionately).
261. See Hoerr, 376 N.W.2d at 332 (reasoning that plaintiffs would not expect such a
reduction "as a natural consequence" of settlement).
262. Id. at 331-32 (construing N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-04(2) (1996) and Bartels v. City
of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113, 122 (N.D. 1979)).
263. See id. at 332 (holding that a plaintiff would not view such a reduction as a "natural
consequence" of settlement).
264. Chart, 258 N.W.2d at 687.
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the other defendants.26 Furthermore, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned
that such a rule would require a plaintiff using a Pierringer release to "step
into the shoes" of the settling defendant.2" Because the value of the
Pierringer release "would become contingent on the lawsuit," the court stated
that a plaintiff would have no motivation to settle.267
Failing to impute an insolvent's share of damages to a Pierringer settle-
ment vitiates the significance of the settlement. An essential element of a
Pierringer settlement is that it does not disrupt claims asserted against other
defendants.2" Allowing settling parties to allocate the risk of insolvency to
nonsettling parties "is fundamentally unfair." '269 That imputation causes the
value of a Pierringer release to be contingent on trial is insignificant because
the value of any Pierringer settlement is contingent on the outcome at trial. 27
Although the risk of a codefendant's insolvency increases the total risk
involved in settlement, courts should allow the settling parties to contract
among themselves for the allocation of that risk.27' Such a system is prefera-
ble to one in which settling parties change the liabilities of nonsettling
parties.2"2 Notably, neither Wisconsin nor North Dakota based their refusal
to impute judgment-proof defendants' shares to prior settlements on grounds
of equity or public policy. Rather, Wisconsin reasoned that, because a plain-
tiff could recover the insolvent's share of damages from any tortfeasor, and
because that tortfeasor had no right of contribution from other defendants, no
such imputation was necessary.2" North Dakota ruled that its legal precedents
265. Id. at 687 n.9 (discussing Bielski v. Schulze, 114 N.W.2d 105, 107 (Wis. 1962)).
266. Id. at 687.
267. See id. at 687-88 (reasoning that requiring a plaintiff to "step into the shoes" of a
settled defendant would defeat the plaintiff's motive to settle because the value of the release
would be contingent on the outcome of a lawsuit).
268. See Siler v. Northern Trust Co., 80 F. Supp. 2d 906, 909 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (stating that
one fundamental characteristic of a Pierringer release is that nonsettling defendants "pay no
more than their fair share of the verdict").
269. Knapp, supra note 237, at 31; see also supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text
(discussing allocation of the risk of insolvency).
270. Knapp, supra note 237, at 30.
271. See id. at 30-31 (noting increased uncertainty because of insolvency and stating that
Minnesota's system, allowing settling parties to allocate the risk of insolvency among them-
selves, is "preferable").
272. See id. at 31 (noting the fundamental unfairness of allowing settling parties to allocate
risks to nonsettling parties).
273. See Chart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 258 N.W.2d 680, 687 (Wis. 1977) (stating that
imputation is based on the assumption of apportionment of an insolvent's share of damages and,
further, that "no rule" provides for the apportionment of an insolvent's share of damages or
contribution to a defendant forced to pay an insolvent's share).
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dictated that a plaintiff's recovery could be reduced only by the amount of the
settled defendant's proportionate liability and, thus, that imputing a portion
of an insolvent's share of damages would not accord with the expectations of
settling plaintiffs." 4 How these courts square the result of these deci-
sions-namely, that certain defendants pay much more than certain other
defendants for reasons unrelated to the parties' relative faults-with basic
notions of comparative fault is unclear, at least to the author of this Note.
A Piernnger settlement is so similar to proportionate share allocation
that the reasoning of one should apply equally to the other. In McDermott, the
Supreme Court noted that a fundamental advantage of the proportionate share
approach was that settlements did not affect the liabilities of nonsettling
defendants.27 Under a system of proportionate share allocation, the risk that
a settlement is too meager or too generous falls entirely on the settling
parties.6 The value of a proportionate share settlement, like a Pierrnnger
settlement, is contingent on trial.2" If a "proportionate share" Pierringer
settlement encompasses all damages assessed against a settling defendant at
trial, so too should a "proportionate share" settlement under the maritime law.
i Conclusion
When the Supreme Court unanimously adopted proportionate share
apportionment, the Justices foresaw this Note's dilemma. In a footnote
discussion, the Court suggested that "[i]t might be thought" that the issue was
one of joint and several liability, and that a nonsettling defendant should
perhaps thus pay both its share of damages and all of the damages allocated
to a judgment-proof codefendant. " 8 Defendants that did not settle would be
the only defendants to which a court allocated judgment-proof defendants'
shares of damages. However, the Court declined to reach the issue after
noting that the plaintiff "ha[d] not requested that [the nonsettling defendant]
pay any more than its 38% share of the damages. " 279 Later in its opinion, the
Court suggested that the issue might be framed as one of proportionate settle-
274. See Hoerr v. Northfield Foundry & Mach. Co., 376 N.W.2d 323, 332 (N.D. 1985)
(reasoning that a plaintiff would not expect a reduction in the verdict of more than a settled
defendant's share of liability).
275. See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 220 (1994) (stating that this
characteristic is a "virtue" of proportionate share apportionment).
276. See id. at 221 (stating that defendants' burdens do not change if a plaintiff's settle-
ment is "meager" or "generous").
277. See id. at 213 (reasoning that settlements will often deviate from trial outcomes for
various reasons).
278. Id. at210 n.10.
279. Id.
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ment, writing that "[w]hen the limitations on the plaintiff's recovery arise
from outside forces, joint and several liability makes the other defendants,
rather than an innocent plaintiff, responsible for the shortfall," but that a
plaintiff's agreement to settle is not a limitation on recovery due to "outside
forces."' 0 In such an instance, according to the Court, "There is no reason to
allocate any shortfall to the other defendants ... .""' If a plaintiff's "volun-
tary" settlement with one defendant eliminates the joint and several relation-
ship among the remaining defendants, then axiomatically the remaining
defendants are liable only for their proportionate shares of damages.
So perhaps the theme here is not one of, "what is the answer?," but is
instead one of, "what is the question?" Framing the issue to be whether or not
joint and several liability makes one defendant liable for damages allocated
to another leads to one result; framing it as whether or not a "voluntary"
partial settlement limits nonsettling defendants to their "proportionate shares"
of damages leads to another. But if both questions are really just their own
answers, then the astute jurist should wonder: What is it that we are actually
asking?
28 2
The Court's pronouncements on joint and several liability and propor-
tionate settlement reach broader than the pigeonholing of "joint and several
liability" and the "proportionate share rule." Both of these concepts are
specific applications of broader principles. The broader principles at play are,
first, full compensation to plaintiffs by operations ofjoint and several liability,
and second, protection of parties' expectations in settlement by the use of pro
rata apportionment. Focusing exclusively on one manifestation or the other
leads to differing results, results that are essentially pre-determined when a
court preliminarily decides that what is really at stake is "joint and several
liability" or "proportionate share" settlement. It is thus necessary to first focus
inquiry on what is really at issue: How do defendants share in joint obliga-
tions to plaintiffs? One can describe this selection of an analytic viewpoint
in a number of ways; one of the simpler ways is with the somewhat-philo-
sophic idea of looking to "mysteries" instead of "answers." 3 In any event,
280. Id. at 221.
281. Id.
282. Cf Donald K. Hill, Law Schoo, Legal Education, and the Black Law Student, 12 T.
MARSHALL L. REv. 457, 486 (1987) ("The objective is accomplished by the method itself. To
the student's question, 'What is the answer, Prof.?,' I pose the proposition, 'The answer is the
question.'").
283. Supra note 87. Some of Ken Kesey's literature also conveys this theme. In One Flew
Over the Cuckoo's Nest, Kesey tells the story of Patrick McMurphy, who teaches other patients
in a mental health facility to question the internal controls of the "Big Nurse." As the story
develops, many of the characters ultimately reject the Big Nurse's rules and procedure, instead
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only by beginning inquiry with the aims of allocation in mind can one hope
to avoid the quagmire that develops when the perceived answer dictates the
content of the question.
Throughout this Note, I have attempted to rely primarily on how courts'
manifestations of the underlying allocative mystery actually fnction; analogy
to factual similarities in the vast expanse of American law secondarily sup-
ports my conclusions. By so doing, I hope that I have kept in mind that, in the
end, it is a method of shifting money among people that we are expounding."4
By turning my eyes to this end, I similarly hope that my analysis shows that
both solutions intimated by the Court are fatally inconsistent with its estab-
lished rationales for allocating damages. Rather, express and implicit princi-
ples of joint and several liability, comparative fault, and pro rata apportion-
ment point towards a scheme in which codefendants pay judgment-proof
defendants' shares of damages on a consistent, predictable basis that does not
change as parties settle. While the reallocation of damages apportioned to
judgment-proof defendants awaits final determination by the Court, I hope
that this Note provides some guidance in the interim.
choosing to live according to their own dictates. Ultimately, the characters and the reader come
to recognize the Big Nurse's ward as its own alter-reality, complete with pronouncements of
right and wrong. The reader thus faces the idea that the frame of reference in which people
operate can change, and that its change can bring about dramatically different viewpoints for
the people involved. See generally KEN KESEY, ONE FLEW OVER THE CuCKoo's NEST (1962).
284. Cf M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819) ("[W]c must never
forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.").

ARTICLES

